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I. Introduction
Until now, U.S. climate change policy at the federal level has consisted of 
voluntary greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation programs, research and development, and a 
subset of energy policies that focus on energy efficiency and renewable energy.  
However, the U.S. government is facing mounting pressure – from both domestic and 
international sources – to establish a federal mandatory reduction program to address the 
risk of global climate change.  If Congress decides to move forward with such a program, 
it could be creating an environmental regulatory regime of unprecedented scope and 
impacts.  Sources of greenhouse gases range from electric power plants to every car on 
the road.  In addition, many policy-makers are considering innovative market-based 
approaches to regulation, including a multi-billion dollar economy-wide “cap-and-trade” 
program.
This paper identifies issues that must be addressed in the design of a mandatory 
domestic GHG reduction program.  The paper then evaluates a number of proposals, 
including (1) comprehensive cap-and-trade programs; (2) a GHG tax; and (3) a “sectoral 
hybrid” program that combines elements of a cap-and-trade program with product 
efficiency standards for automobiles and consumer products.
While there is a substantial body of opinion (particularly among economists) that 
an economy-wide cap-and-trade or GHG tax program may be optimal from a cost-
effectiveness point of view, it is possible that a GHG regulatory program will be 
developed from discrete familiar elements (such as existing Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy [CAFE] and appliance efficiency standards, plus large stationary source 
controls modeled on the acid-rain control program).  Rather than creating a whole new 
system, Congress may choose the latter approach both because of familiarity and because 
of political sensitivity about program designs that result in overt increases in prices for 
gasoline and home heating fuels.  We review the implications of these two fundamentally 
different approaches.
5While this paper focuses on options for federal regulatory policies, it is important 
to note that a domestic climate change program could enhance its regulatory policies with 
a range of non-regulatory measures, such as funding for research and development into 
new technologies, financial and other incentives, public education, and changes in 
infrastructure and land-use policies. In addition, state and local governments may 
supplement a federal regulatory program with their own policy initiatives.2
II. U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Profile
Domestic climate change policy will likely focus on reductions or sequestration of 
emissions of six GHGs:  carbon dioxide (CO2); methane (CH4); nitrous oxide (N2O); and 
what have been called the “synthetic gases,” hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 
perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6).3
Because GHGs have long lifetimes in the atmosphere, it matters little where or 
exactly when GHG emission reductions are made.  For example, a ton emitted in the 
United States has the same impact as a ton emitted in Malaysia, and reducing a ton of 
GHG emissions now rather than five years from now will make little difference in 
atmospheric GHG concentrations in 2050.  This means that an effective regulatory 
program can allow flexibility as to where emissions reductions occur and substantial but 
not unlimited flexibility as to when they occur.  
2
 For more information on current state and local climate change policy initiatives, see the Pew Center on 
Global Climate Change’s State and Local Net Greenhouse Gas Reduction Programs database, available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/states/index1.cfm.
3
 HFCs and PFCs are industrial products that are substitutes for ozone-depleting substances.  Ozone-
depleting substances themselves are GHGs, but the U.S. and other countries are phasing out these 
substances pursuant to an international treaty, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-10 (1987), 26 I.L.M. 1541 (entered into force Jan. 1, 
1989).  Certain other gases – carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and non-methane volatile 
organic compounds (NMVOCs) – are not GHGs but have an indirect effect on climate change by 
influencing the creation and destruction of tropospheric and stratospheric ozone. These gases are “criteria 
pollutants” under the Clean Air Act and therefore subject to established regulatory regimes.  Emissions of 
another criteria pollutant, sulfur dioxide (SO2), also indirectly affect climate change by altering the 
absorptive characteristics of the atmosphere. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, INVENTORY 
OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-2001 (EPA Office of Atmospheric Programs, 430-R-03-
004, April 2003) (hereinafter USEPA). 
6Different GHGs vary as to their residence lives in the atmosphere and their heat-
trapping, or “radiative forcing,” effects.  Some GHGs have very long atmospheric 
lifetimes. 4  The Kyoto Protocol adopts a weighting formula called “Global Warming 
Potential” (GWP), that measures the impact of one ton of any GHG with reference to one 
ton of CO2. With such an agreed-upon “exchange rate,” policy-makers can develop a 
unitary program objective in terms of “CO2-equivalent” units, which allows regulated 
firms to pick whatever mix of reductions of different GHGs they believe is most cost-
effective.  
A. Carbon Dioxide
Carbon dioxide emissions (almost entirely from combustion of fossil fuels) 
dominate GHG emissions in the United States and are likely to be among the principal 
initial targets of any domestic GHG regulatory program.  In 2001, energy-related CO2
emissions accounted for approximately 85 percent of U.S. GWP-weighted emissions.5
Within the energy sector, the principal means of abating CO2 emissions are 
switching from energy sources with high carbon content to those (such as renewables) 
with low or zero carbon content; improving the efficiency of energy conversion or use; 
reducing energy use (conservation); and developing carbon capture and sequestration 
technologies. 
Annual U.S. CO2 emissions also are affected by land use, land-use change, and 
forestry (LULUCF) activities.  Plants and certain other biotic matter remove CO2 from 
the atmosphere and store or “sequester” it as carbon, at least temporarily, through the 
process of photosynthesis.  Hence, forests and agricultural lands are “reservoirs” of 
carbon and a range of activities can enhance their sequestration potential.  Conversely, 
certain land-use changes, such as deforestation, can oxidize the carbon stored in biotic 
matter, thereby leading to CO2 emissions.  
4
 For example, a ton of PFCs can persist in the atmosphere for 10-50,000 years.  See CLIMATE CHANGE 
2001:  THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT OF 
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 47 (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 2001).  
5 See USEPA, supra note 3, at 2-1.
7B. Other GHGs
Methane is the second-largest contributor to U.S. GHG emissions, constituting 8.7 
percent of total U.S. GWP-weighted emissions in 2001.6  Methane is emitted from 
landfills; natural gas and petroleum production, transportation, and processing; 
agricultural activities; coal mining; stationary and mobile combustion; wastewater 
treatment; and certain industrial processes.7
Nitrous oxide is a GHG with heat-trapping potential that exceeds that of CO2 by 
an order of magnitude.  Emissions of nitrous oxide made up 6.1 percent of U.S. GWP-
weighted emissions in 2001.8  The primary human activities resulting in emissions of 
nitrous oxide are agricultural soil management, fuel combustion in motor vehicles, and 
production processes for adipic and nitric acid.9
Emissions of HFCs and PFCs are primarily associated with their use as substitutes 
for ozone depleting substances banned under the Montreal Protocol treaty.10  Emissions 
of HFCs, PFCs, and SF6 also result from certain other industrial processes, including 
production of primary aluminum, certain steps in the manufacture of products in the 
semi-conductor industry, and activities related to the operation of electrical transmission 
and distribution equipment.  These gases have very powerful heat-trapping effects.  They 
constituted 1.6 percent of U.S. GWP-weighted emissions in 2001.11
C. U.S. GHG Emissions Trends
Eventual stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of GHGs will require very 
large reductions in GHG emissions worldwide.  Notwithstanding a slight decline in 
6 Id. at ES-3, Table ES-1. 
7 Id. at ES-18-20.
8 Id. at ES-3, Table ES-1.
9 Id. at ES-20-22.
10
 See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, supra note 3.  
11 See USEPA, supra note 3, at ES-3, Table ES-1.
8200112, U.S. emissions are projected to increase.  As discussed above, U.S. emissions 
were 11.9 percent higher in 2001 than they were in 1990.  Between 1990 and 2000, the 
GHG “intensity” of the U.S. economy (the ratio of total GHG emissions to economic 
output) declined by 17.5 percent.13  In a report submitted to the United Nations in 2002, 
the U.S. government projected that U.S. GHG emissions would rise 42 percent from 
year-2000 levels by 2020.14
III. Domestic Climate Policy Framework 
The existing federal framework for addressing climate change in the U.S. is a 
combination of voluntary programs, tax incentives, energy efficiency standards, and 
research and development (R&D).  These programs, and certain Clean Air Act 
provisions, are described below. 
A. Voluntary Programs 
Since 1993, the federal government has established a number of voluntary GHG 
emissions reduction programs to encourage businesses to undertake GHG mitigation 
actions.  This approach began with the Clinton Administration’s “Climate Change Action 
Plan” (CCAP).15  The Bush Administration has adopted a similar voluntary strategy.16   A 
12 See ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, EMISSIONS OF 
GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE UNITED STATES, DOE/EIA-0573, ix (December 2002).  According to the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration (EIA), U.S. GHG emissions declined 1.2 percent in 2001.  The EIA 
attributed this decrease to reduced economic growth, warmer winter weather, and reduced electricity 
demand.  
13 Id. at 15.
14 See U.S. Department of State, U.S. Climate Action Report – 2002, Third National Communications of the 
United States of America Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 73 (2002), 
available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/ResourceCenterPublicationsUSClimateActionRepor
t.html.  This projection did not take into account the effects of the Bush Administration’s climate policy 
announced on February 14, 2002.  
15 See WILLIAM J. CLINTON AND AL GORE, THE CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN (1993).  The Climate 
Change Action Plan (CCAP) included the “Green Lights” program (encouraging business to upgrade 
lighting); the “Natural Gas Star” program (encouraging voluntary methane reductions by natural gas 
producers and distributors); the “Coalbed Methane Outreach” Program (encouraging coal mining firms to 
capture and use methane that otherwise would be vented to the atmosphere); and two programs under 
9key supporting element of both the Clinton and Bush Administration voluntary programs 
is the Department of Energy’s (DOE) voluntary GHG reporting program under section 
1605(b) of the Energy Policy Act of 1992.17  The §1605(b) program authorizes DOE to 
develop a system to document voluntary GHG mitigation actions reported by firms and 
other firms participating in various voluntary programs.  Electric utilities, in particular, 
have reported numerous projects under the §1605(b) program. 
While the various voluntary programs have led to a significant number of 
emission reduction projects, overall emissions levels have continued to increase.  Several 
factors have contributed to the limited effectiveness of voluntary programs.18  First, while 
some participants in the these programs have committed to taking particular mitigation 
actions, they have not in many cases committed to limiting their company-wide 
emissions below a particular baseline, and, for many, total system emissions increased 
substantially in response to increased market demand for products and services.  Second, 
some participants committed to actions that they might have implemented anyway for 
business reasons.  In particular, commentators have asserted that the §1605(b) program 
lacks rigorous reporting standards and verification requirements, and concerns have been 
which businesses committed to take actions to mitigate their GHG emissions and to report those actions in 
a transparent format.  One program, “Climate Wise,” established such agreements with individual 
businesses, nonprofit groups, and state and local governments.  A second program, “Climate Challenge,” 
established agreements with electric utilities.  For more information on programs developed under the 
CCAP, see http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming/actions/national/partnership.html.  
16 See George W. Bush, Global Climate Change Policy Book (February 2002).  The Bush Administration 
climate policy has included: the National Climate Change Research Initiative; the National Climate Change 
Technology Initiative (which focuses on geological sequestration); the FutureGen Initiative (which aims to 
develop a “zero-emissions” coal-fired power plants; the FreedomCAR Initiative (which aims to develop 
and deploy hydrogen fuel-cell vehicles); the Hydrogen Fuel Initiative (which aims to develop viable fuel 
cells and hydrogen infrastructure); and the Climate VISION Program (which aims to establish voluntary 
emission reduction agreements with key sectors of the economy).
17 See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, §1605(b) 106 Stat. 2776 (codified at 42. U.S.C. § 
13885 (1994)).  Rules for the §1605(b) program are set forth at 59 Fed. Reg. 52769 (Oct. 19, 1994).  
18
 For a critical review of the rigor and effectiveness of voluntary programs established under the CCAP, 
see NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, REPORTED “REDUCTIONS,” RISING EMISSIONS (Nov. 2001), 
available at http://www.nrdc.org; see also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GLOBAL WARMING: 
INFORMATION ON THE RESULTS OF FOUR OF EPA’S VOLUNTARY CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAMS
(GAO/RCED-97-163, June 1997).
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raised that some reductions reported under the program have been double-counted.19  The 
Bush Administration has pledged to address these shortcomings in a planned upgrade to 
the program to be completed by the end of 2004.20  However, any voluntary program 
remains subject to a fundamental limitation – it only addresses the emissions of those 
firms that volunteer to participate.21
For these reasons, current U.S. voluntary programs, while helpful in building 
awareness, encouraging experimentation, and achieving some company-level emissions 
reductions, are not expected to reduce or even stabilize U.S. GHG emissions in the next 
decade relative to current levels.  
In addition to the voluntary GHG programs described above, the U.S. government 
has established a number of non-regulatory programs aimed at increasing energy 
efficiency.22  Because energy-related GHG emissions make up approximately 80 percent 
of total U.S. emissions, these programs contribute to reducing GHG emissions.  
However, like the voluntary GHG reduction programs, they do not impose actual limits 
on emissions, and are incapable of achieving substantial emissions reductions with a high 
degree of certainty. 
19 See PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, GREENHOUSE GAS REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE:  KEY 
ELEMENTS OF A PROSPECTIVE U.S. PROGRAM (2002), available at http://www.pewclimate.org.
20
 At the end of 2003, the Department of Energy published proposed revisions to the §1605(b) General 
Guidelines.  See 68 Fed Reg. 68204 (December 5, 2003).  For more information on the Administration’s 
efforts to enhance the §1605(b) Program, see http://www.pi.energy.gov/enhancingGHGregistry/index.html.  
To this the Administration is holding a series of workshops.  See id.
21 See Natural Resources Defense Council, supra note 18.  See also THOMAS P. LYON, VOLUNTARY 
VERSUS MANDATORY APPROACHES TO CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION (Resources for the Future Issue 
Brief 03-01 February 2003), available at http://www.rff.org; David Gardiner and Lisa Jacobson, Will 
Voluntary Programs be Sufficient to Reduce U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions? 44 ENV’T 24 (Oct. 2002).
22
 Two voluntary energy efficiency programs, “Industries of the Future” and “National Industrial 
Competitiveness through Energy, Environment, and Economics” (NICE3), established public-private 
partnerships to encourage businesses and state governments to adopt best practices and technologies. For 
more information on the Industries of the Future and NICE3 programs, see
http://www.oit.doe.gov/prog.shmtl.  Another initiative, the “Energy Star” program, steers consumers to 
energy efficient products by awarding a government “Energy Star” label to such products.  To earn an 
“Energy Star” label, a product typically must be in the upper quartile of its product class when it comes to 
energy efficiency.  For descriptions of other federal energy efficiency programs, see Consumer Energy 
Information: EREC Reference Briefs, available at
http://www.eren.doe.gov/consumerinfo/refbriefs/la7.html.
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Finally, federal tax law provides a range of tax credits and other incentives to 
encourage use of renewable energy and fuel-efficient vehicles.  These include: a 
deduction for a portion of the purchase cost of a “clean-fuel” vehicle (defined to include 
hybrids); a credit for the purchase of an electric vehicle; an investment credit for solar or 
geothermal energy equipment and favorable depreciation rates for such equipment; and a 
credit for production of electricity from wind, certain types of biomass, or poultry 
waste.23  Congress is considering a number of additional tax incentives and modifications 
to existing tax programs in the context of proposed federal energy legislation.  
B. Product efficiency standards
1. CAFE
Existing federal law includes two major mandatory energy efficiency programs: 
one for automobiles, the other for consumer products other than automobiles.  Both were 
established in 1975 under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA).24  The 
program for motor vehicles – known as Corporate Average Fuel Economy or “CAFE” –
requires each automobile manufacturer or importer to meet average fuel economy 
standards for the fleet of new vehicles it manufactures or imports in each model year.  
These standards are expressed in miles per gallon (“mpg”).  Separate standards are set for 
passenger automobiles and “light-duty trucks” (including sport utility vehicles [“SUVs”] 
and minivans), currently at 27.5 mpg and 20.5 mpg respectively.25
The statute applies only to new vehicles and does not regulate in-use consumption 
of fuel.  More stringent standards improve on-the-road fuel economy only to the extent 
that new vehicles replace less efficient existing vehicles.26    In addition, for new vehicles, 
23 See 26 U.S.C. §179(a); 26 U.S.C. §48; 26 U.S.C. §168; and 26 U.S.C. §45.
24
 Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (automobile fuel 
economy standards are codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 32,901-32,919 (1994)).
25
 Another federal law influencing automobile fuel economy is the “gas guzzler” tax.  See Internal Revenue 
Code, 26 U.S.C. §4064.  Under this law, cars achieving less than 22.5 mpg are subject to a sliding scale of 
tax charges, ranging from $1,000 to $7,700.  Light-duty trucks are exempt.
26
 However, the current program does not provide consumers with incentives to purchase new fuel-efficient 
vehicles even if they are available and in fact may retard turnover to the extent it drives up the cost of new 
vehicles.
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if vehicle miles traveled (VMT) increase faster than average fuel economy, overall fuel 
use will go up notwithstanding the CAFE requirements.  
The statute contains a number of idiosyncratic features that increase its 
complexity, while decreasing its effectiveness.  Trucks and SUVs are subject to far less 
stringent standards than cars.  Compliance with the standard is determined separately for 
vehicles manufactured in the United States, Canada, or Mexico and those manufactured 
elsewhere but used in the United States.  Special credit is given to electric vehicles and to 
alternative fuel-capable vehicles. 
While the CAFE program made a significant contribution to moderating U.S. fuel 
use in the first years after its enactment, its impact has declined over time for a number of 
reasons.  First, the standards were frozen for many years, and, in addition, have not taken 
into account the increasing proportions of truck, SUV, and minivan sales; starting in 
2001, such “light-duty trucks” made up over 50 percent of vehicles sold.27 The decision 
of Congress to freeze the standards throughout most of the 1990s, combined with the 
change in product mix has had the effect of decreasing the ability of the program to 
moderate fuel use. Second, real gasoline prices have declined, encouraging more driving 
and dampening incentives for drivers to demand more efficient vehicles.  Accordingly, 
even though fuel economy for cars has improved since enactment of CAFE, overall fuel 
use (and, therefore, GHG emissions) has risen steadily.28
27 See Michelle Maynard, Bracing for Soft Sales, Carmakers Seek Out Higher Ground, N.Y. Times, Jan. 
11, 2002, at F1. Congress lifted its freeze on CAFE standards in 2001.  See The Department of 
Transportation and Related Agencies Act of 2001 for FY 2002, Pub. L. 107-87 (2001).  The Bush 
Administration, through the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, has proposed increasing the 
CAFE standard for light trucks from its current level of 20.7 mpg to: 21 mpg for model year 2005, 21.6 
mpg for model year 2006, and 22.2 mpg for model year 2007.  See National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Light Truck Average Fuel Economy, 67 Fed. Reg. 77015 
(Dec. 16, 2002).   
28 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT OF CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL 
ECONOMY (CAFE) STANDARDS, 19-20, Figure 2-9 (2002).
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Of course, policy-makers did not design CAFE as a domestic GHG regulatory 
program and to function as one it would need not only to have the features noted above 
corrected (i.e., remove the freeze on more stringent standards and modify the electric 
vehicle and alternative fuel credits29), but also the mpg standard would have to be 
translated into terms of pounds of CO2 / mile to take into account the carbon content of 
fuel.  And, as discussed below, a number of other changes would be needed to integrate 
such a program into a domestic cap-and-trade program for GHGs. 
2. Appliance Standards
EPCA also established an energy efficiency program for consumer products other 
than autos – usually referred to as the “appliance efficiency program.”30  It includes 
mandatory energy labeling and energy efficiency standards for a wide range of consumer 
products, including air conditioners, washers, dryers, kitchen ranges and furnaces.  
Standards also cover some equipment used in industrial applications, such as most 
industrial motors.31   According to DOE, the standards program has resulted in a greater 
than 1 quad reduction of energy use annually (equivalent to roughly one percent of 
energy use or about 75 million tons of CO2).32  It aims at requiring for each type of 
consumer product the maximum energy efficiency that is technologically feasible and 
29 The electric vehicle credit does not take into account GHG emissions associated with electric generation.  
The alternative fuel credit is available for vehicles that are capable of using alternative fuels, whether or not 
these fuels are actually used.  
30 See Energy Policy Conservation Act of 1975, supra note 24, (appliance efficiency standards are codified 
at 42 U.S.C.A §§6291-6309).
31
 For more information on existing energy efficiency standards for commercial and industrial equipment, 
see OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE TECHNOLOGY,U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, 
BUILDING TECHNOLOGIES PROGRAM: APPLIANCES AND COMMERCIAL EQUIPMENT STANDARDS, available at
http://www.eren.doe.gov/buildings/appliance_standards/.
32
 Personal communication with Michael McCabe, Acting Program Manager, Office of Building 
Technologies, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Technology, U.S. Department of Energy; and T. 
Kubo et al., Opportunities for New Appliance and Equipment Efficiency Standards, in AMERICAN COUNCIL 
FOR AN ENERGY EFFICIENT ECONOMY (Report #A016, 5, Sept. 2001).
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economically justified; but its complex regulatory framework makes prompt action to 
promulgate stringent new standards quite difficult.33
While the standards program in its present form could be used for GHG 
regulatory purposes, it would be better adapted to that purpose if the standards were 
expressed in the form of direct or indirect GHG emissions per unit of output, and if a 
trading feature could link it to GHG regulation in other sectors. 
C. Clean Air Act
Aside from a requirement that electricity generators (who account for about 1/3 of 
U.S. GHG emissions) monitor and report their CO2 emissions, the Clean Air Act (CAA)34
does not directly address control of GHG emissions, much less explicitly authorize GHG 
regulation.  The question of whether EPA has implied authority under the Clean Air Act 
to regulate GHGs – i.e., by virtue of its Clean Air Act authority to regulate “air 
pollutants” – is the subject of vigorous debate.35
This debate is beyond the scope of this paper, which contemplates action by 
Congress to establish a GHG regulatory program by statute, rather than action by EPA 
using its existing Clean Air Act authorities.  Nevertheless, it is worth observing that the 
acid rain provisions of the Clean Air Act present a useful model for a cap-and-trade 
program applicable to CO2 emissions from electricity generators – which is one of the 
33
 In the case of electric appliances, CO2 emissions are from the electric generator rather than from the 
appliance, as in the case of gas appliances.  As with CAFE, the efficiency standards are expressed in terms 
of energy use, not GHG emissions.  Also, efficiency standards on appliances are currently not comparable 
across energy types.  Thus for example, a highly efficient electric water heater produces much more CO2 
emissions than a gas water heater of fairly low efficiency because the efficiency of fuel to electric 
conversion is so low.  For the appliance standard program to work in the GHG context, the standards 
should reflect revised direct and indirect CO2 emissions.  
34 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1998) (hereinafter “CAA”).
35
 In response to a petition for rulemaking, EPA published a decision stating it lacks authority under the 
Clean Air Act to regulate GHGs to address climate change.  See Control of Emissions From New Highway 
Vehicles and Engines:  Notice of Denial, 68 Fed. Reg. 52922 (September 8, 2003) (“Notice of Denial”).  A 
number of state attorneys general and environmental groups have filed a petition for review of the Notice of 
Denial in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
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models for GHG regulation considered below.36 The Acid Rain program imposes a 
national limit on SO2 emissions from electricity generators (currently set at 8.9 million 
tons per year), allocates to existing sources allowances to emit specified quantities of 
SO2, and allows sources to trade and bank allowances, so that they can pursue least-cost 
compliance strategies.  
D. Options for a Domestic Program to Secure Greenhouse Gas 
Reductions
While voluntary programs, the CAFE program, tax incentives, and product 
efficiency standards have contributed to reductions in GHGs that would not otherwise 
have occurred, they neither individually nor collectively are likely to achieve significant 
economy-wide reductions in GHG emissions from current levels.37  Substantial attention 
has been given to formulating and evaluating a range of alternative mechanisms for 
controlling U.S. GHG emissions.  For example, several bills have been introduced that 
would establish a CO2 cap-and-trade program for electric utilities, modeled on the SO2
program under Title IV of the CAA.38  In January 2003, Senators John McCain (R-AZ) 
and Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) introduced legislation that would establish an economy-
36
 The Acid Rain program is set forth in Title IV of the Clean Air Act and related regulations.  For an 
examination of the Acid Rain program and other trading programs and the lessons those programs may 
hold for GHG emissions trading, see A. DENNY ELLERMAN, ET AL., PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE, EMISSIONS TRADING: EXPERIENCE, LESSONS, AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES
(forthcoming 2003).
37 See generally D. SMITH ET AL., PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, DESIGNING A CLIMATE-
FRIENDLY ENERGY POLICY:  OPTIONS FOR THE NEAR-TERM (2002), available at 
http://www.pewclimate.org (suggesting that even implementation of a “climate-friendly energy policy” 
would not be adequate to reduce U.S. GHG emission levels to year-1990 levels); see also PEW CENTER FOR 
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, PEW CENTER ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENT BUSH’S FEBRUARY 14TH CLIMATE 
CHANGE PLAN, available at http://www.pewclimate.org/policy/response_bushpolicy.cfm (providing a 
critical assessment of the Bush Administration’s proposed voluntary programs.)
38
 These bills are the Clean Air Planning Act of 2003, S. 843, 108th Cong. (2003) (Sen. Carper, R-DE); the 
Clean Smokestacks Act of 2003, H.R. 2042, 108th Cong. (2003) (Rep. Waxman, D-CA); the Clean Power 
Act of 2003, S.366, 108th Cong. (2003) (Sen. Jeffords, I-VT).
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wide GHG cap-and-trade program.39  In March 2004, a companion version of the 
McCain-Lieberman bill was introduced in the House.40
The principal options for a mandatory GHG reduction program (and the ones we 
evaluate below) are:  
• Cap-and-Trade: A comprehensive cap-and-trade program, similar in many respects to 
the acid-rain program, that allocates or auctions a fixed number of tradable  
allowances to emitters and requires them to surrender allowances equal to their 
emissions in a particular compliance period (“downstream” cap-and-trade).  A variant 
of this program requires firms to surrender allowances equal to the carbon content of 
the fuel and the GHG content of certain other products they sell each year (“upstream 
cap-and-trade”).
• GHG tax: A tax either on GHG emissions or on the carbon content of fuel and the 
GHG content of certain other products.
• Sectoral Hybrid: A program that combines a large-source cap-and-trade program with 
product efficiency standards, that is, standards for consumer products and equipment 
that prescribe emissions-per-unit-of-output (e.g., lbs. of CO2 per mile) or energy 
efficiency levels. 
We also discuss in general terms additional options such as stationary source emissions 
standards, stand-alone product efficiency standards, and a stand-alone large-source cap-
and-trade program. 
IV. Design Criteria for a Domestic GHG Regulatory Program
Evaluating different GHG regulatory program options involves a number of 
considerations.  The first design decision is establishing the program’s emissions 
reduction objective. Once an emissions reduction objective is set, policy-makers have to 
design a regulatory program to meet it.  Key design criteria include environmental 
39 See Climate Stewardship Act of 2003, S. 139, 108th Cong. (2003) (the “McCain/Lieberman Bill”).  In 
October 2003, the McCain-Lieberman Bill was defeated 43-55 in the U.S. Senate.  Senators McCain and 
Lieberman have pledged to re-introduce the bill.  
40 See Climate Stewardship Act of 2004, H.R. 4067, 108th Cong. (2004) (Rep. Gilchrest, D-MD)
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effectiveness, cost, administrative feasibility, distributional equity, and political 
acceptability.  The sections that follow elaborate on each of these criteria.  
The emissions reduction target for a domestic program establishes the level and 
timing of reductions at the national level.  The target can be set for purposes of 
compliance with an international obligation or could be established as a matter of 
domestic policy, independent of any international obligations.  Moreover, it could take 
the form of a cap on domestic GHG emissions or a limit on GHG emissions per unit of 
output (also referred to as an “emissions intensity” target).  It could establish a GHG 
reduction target for an initial compliance period, or it could establish a long-term 
emissions reduction path, phasing in progressively more stringent targets over an 
extended period of time.  This paper does not address the issues of whether or how to set 
a target, or what target to set.  Instead, it evaluates different designs for a program that 
will meet whatever target is decided upon.41
The criteria for evaluating design options are described below.
A. Environmental Effectiveness:  How effective is the program in 
meeting its emission reductions target?
A regulatory program’s effectiveness in meeting its target is a function of a 
number of factors, including its coverage of sources throughout the economy, its certainty 
in meeting a particular emissions target, and its provisions for enforcement.  
1. Coverage:  Are all sources and gases covered?
A program’s coverage refers to the extent to which it directly or indirectly 
regulates sources of GHG emissions throughout the U.S. economy and applies to the full 
range of GHGs.  Broad coverage is preferable from an environmental perspective (but 
may have to be balanced by considerations of administrative cost).  Compared to a 
program with full coverage, a program with only partial coverage either will reduce 
41
 For a review of the debate between proponents of aggressive near-term emission reduction policies and 
proponents of “back-loading” deeper emission reductions to future years, see M. TOMAN, RESOURCES FOR 
THE FUTURE, MOVING AHEAD WITH CLIMATE POLICY, 5-7 (Resources for the Future Climate Change Issue 
Brief #26, Oct. 2000) available at http://www.rff.org.  The question of how to design a regulatory program 
to implement a carbon-intensity target is not addressed in this paper.
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emissions less or will attain the same emission reductions at much higher cost (because it 
excludes opportunities for inexpensive reductions in uncovered sectors or gases).  
Programs with only partial coverage (including opt-ins) also risk “leakage.”  Leakage 
occurs when a regulatory program encourages shifting of emission-generating activities 
from regulated to non-regulated firms.  
2. Environmental Certainty:  Will the program ensure that the 
emission reductions target will be met?
Some program designs provide greater certainty that total emissions from 
regulated firms will not exceed a particular level.  For example, a “quantity-based” 
approach, such as a conventional cap-and-trade program, enforces an overall limit on 
emissions from the covered firms.42  By contrast, “price-based” approaches, such as 
emission taxes or trading programs with a “safety valve”, do not place a precise limit on 
total emissions but instead impose a particular price or price limits on a ton of emissions.  
(See discussion at V.A. 4 of pros and cons of safety valve approach.)  While establishing 
an emissions charge or tax has the effect of reducing emissions, the approach does not 
ensure that emissions will be reduced to a precise level.  In addition, as explained below, 
a standards approach that limits emissions-per-unit-of-output (as opposed to tons-per-
year) – often referred to as a “carbon intensity” approach – will not achieve a particular 
emission reduction target with certainty.  However, because it is cumulative rather than 
annual emissions that are important, taxes or standards should be able to provide almost 
equivalent environmental certainty if there is political will to adjust them over time. 
3. Enforcement:  Is the program enforceable?
Any regulatory program’s overall success in reducing emissions also is a function 
of its enforcement mechanisms.  Enforcement is, in turn, a function of clear rules, precise 
42
 As discussed in section III below, a cap-and-trade program could require firms to surrender allowances 
for their CO2 emissions (downstream) or it could require firms to surrender allowances for the CO2
emissions imputable to the fuel they sell or produced (upstream).  To simplify matters, this section of the 
paper refers to programs that limit “emissions.”  However, all the observations here apply with equal force 
to programs that limit the carbon content of fuels.
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and effective measurement of emissions, pursuit of violators, and having non-compliance 
penalties high enough to exceed any benefits associated with non-compliance.43
B. Cost- Effectiveness:  Will the program design allow cost-effective 
compliance?
A key consideration in evaluating a GHG regulatory program is whether it 
permits compliance with the program’s target at least cost to the U.S. economy – what we 
refer to as “cost-effective” compliance.  The first cost-related issue is the direct cost of 
complying with the program.  A program designed to meet a particular target minimizes 
compliance costs to the extent that it maximizes flexibility to adopt a least-cost 
compliance strategy—that is, flexibility as to what, where, and when emission reductions 
are attained.  In addition, some program designs can cap compliance costs (but do so at 
the risk of missing the program’s target).  Another key cost-related consideration is 
administrative cost.  Finally, some program designs raise revenue, which, as explained 
below, could be used to offset part of the overall cost of the program by reducing 
“distortionary” taxes on capital and labor.
1. Flexibility:  Will the program provide flexibility as to how, where, 
and when emissions reductions are attained?
A cost-effective program will provide wide flexibility to regulated firms in 
determining how to reduce emissions to meet the program target (“what” flexibility), 
where to reduce them (“where” flexibility), and within limits, when to reduce them 
(“when” flexibility). “What” flexibility implies that a firm can comply by implementing 
any of the full range of GHG mitigation measures, including increasing energy 
efficiency; switching fuels; reducing consumption; adopting land use, land-use change, 
and forestry (LULUCF) measures (including agriculture); or taking other action to reduce 
or sequester GHGs.  Second, it implies that firms can comply through reductions in any 
of the major GHGs   Third, it implies that firms that can achieve low-cost reductions will 
undertake a greater proportion of emission reductions tha firms that achieve reductions at 
43
 For a review of compliance enforcement mechanisms, including non-sanctioning mechanisms, see ERIC 
DANNENMAIER AND ISAAC COHEN, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, PROMOTING MEANINGFUL 
COMPLIANCE WITH CLIMATE CHANGE COMMITMENTS (2000).
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higher costs. Many different kinds of firms and activities generate emissions of different 
GHGs; their costs of reducing those emissions and the means of reduction available to 
them vary widely. A program with maximum “what” flexibility has the effect of equating 
marginal costs of mitigation across all firms subject to the program, thereby generating 
the lowest-cost distribution of abatement activities throughout the economy.44
The other critical benefit of building “what” flexibility into the U.S. climate 
policy architecture from the beginning is that it spurs technical innovation.  Achieving the 
long-term aim of stabilizing atmospheric concentrations will not be possible without the 
development and wide-spread deployment of a range of next-generation approaches to 
climate protection, including new clean energy technologies.  Policy approaches that 
prescribe the use of particular technologies, such as design standards, provide little 
incentive for developing such next-generation approaches.  By contrast, approaches that 
specify environmental outcomes or place a price on environmental damage without 
prescribing the means of compliance can stimulate the kind of innovation that ultimately 
will be needed to achieve deeper emission reductions over time. 
“Where” flexibility implies that the program will recognize reductions achieved 
throughout the world. A domestic GHG program that is integrated with the emerging 
international market in GHG emission reductions almost certainly will have lower 
compliance costs than a program that credits only reductions made within the United 
States.45  Studies have suggested that opening up a U.S. climate program to trading even 
with just the industrialized countries that are subject to Kyoto Protocol emission limits 
could reduce a U.S. program’s marginal (incremental) abatement cost by anywhere 
between 13 percent and 68 percent.46  Gains from trade would be far greater if the U.S. 
44 See R. Stewart and P. Sands, The Legal and Institutional Framework for a Plurilateral Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Trading System, in GREENHOUSE GAS MARKET PERSPECTIVES:  TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME 5-6 (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, 2001).
45 See RICHARD ROSENZWEIG, ET AL., PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, THE EMERGING 
INTERNATIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS MARKET (2002), available at http://www.pewclimate.org.
46 See Jae Edmonds, et al., International Emissions Trading, in CLIMATE CHANGE:  SCIENCE, STRATEGIES, 
AND SOLUTIONS 245, 257 (Table 6) (Eileen Claussen ed., 2001).  Edmonds and his colleagues compare the 
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program credited reductions achieved in developing countries, where low-cost abatement 
options are in abundant supply.47  For these reasons, the ultimate cost of a U.S. climate 
change program will depend in great measure on the extent to which it provides for 
international emissions trading. 
“When” flexibility provides the regulated firm with choices as to the timing of 
emission reductions.  Even before the regulatory program becomes binding, policy-
makers can establish a “credit for early action” policy to assure firms that any pre-
program efforts to reduce emissions will be recognized. Such early reduction efforts 
would have the same environmental value as reductions made after the regulatory 
program has commenced.48  Policy-makers also can set an ultimate compliance deadline 
for the regulatory program that gives firms sufficient lead time to develop cost-effective 
control strategies and that allows a market for emission reductions to evolve.  Further, in 
establishing a program’s emissions target, consideration can be given to determining 
compliance on the basis of a multi-year emissions average rather than the level of 
emissions in a single year.  A multi-year approach gives firms the flexibility to manage 
their emissions over time and avoids penalizing them for emissions changes caused by 
difficult-to-control fluctuations in business cycles and the weather.  
Other “when” flexibility measures include “banking” and “borrowing.”  Programs 
can be designed so that firms that overcomply can “bank” emission credits and use them 
in a subsequent compliance period or sell them at a later date when prices in the trading 
market might be higher.  A “borrowing” provision would allow a firm to comply with its 
obligations in one compliance period in part by committing to even deeper-than-required 
results of five different studies that modeled the marginal abatement costs associated with a program aimed 
at reducing industrial country GHG emissions 5.2 percent from 1990 levels in 2010.
47 Id. at 254.  Indeed, a U.S. program that credits reductions achieved in countries not subject to emission 
limits will have lower costs even if the cost of reductions in those countries is the same as in the United 
States.  
48 But see ROBERT R. NORDHAUS AND STEPHEN C. FOTIS, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, 
EARLY ACTION AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 28-29 (1998), available at http://www.pewclimate.org
(discussing the policy challenge of developing a “baseline” for the purpose of distinguishing reductions that 
would have occurred even in the absence of the program [“anyway” tons] from those that occurred as a 
result of the program [“additional” tons]). 
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reductions in the subsequent compliance period.  With a limited borrowing provision, a 
regulatory program could obtain a greater overall level of emission reductions from those 
firms that could benefit from additional time to modify their operations or invest in new 
technologies.  (A multi-year compliance period approach would offer similar temporal 
flexibility as a borrowing provision.)  A firm’s ability to borrow has to be limited, 
however, lest it become a means of simply avoiding reductions. 
2. Cost Predictability:  Are costs of compliance reasonably 
predictable?
A regulatory program also can be designed so that total compliance costs are 
capped.  As discussed above, “price-based” approaches, such as emissions taxes, do not 
provide assurances that a particular level of emission reductions will be achieved.  On the 
other hand, such programs do provide assurances that the costs of compliance will not 
rise above a particular per-ton level.  This kind of certainty about costs generally is not 
possible with a quantity-based program, such as a traditional cap-and-trade program, 
where it is implied that the quantitative limit on emissions will be enforced regardless of 
compliance costs.  To address the risk of spiraling compliance costs associated with a 
cap-and-trade program, some have proposed a “safety-valve” mechanism, in which 
additional allowances would be made available at a pre-set price representing the 
maximum acceptable cost.  
3. Raising Revenue:  Will the program raise revenues that can be 
used to offset a portion of its costs?
Some program designs that raise revenue, such as GHG taxes or allowance 
auctions, offer an opportunity to offset economic costs of the program borne by particular 
sectors through financial assistance programs or reduce the overall cost of the program 
through a reduction in federal taxes.  Economic analysis indicates that programs that 
recycle the revenue to reduce distortionary taxes on capital, labor, or income have 
significant potential to reduce overall costs of a GHG regulatory program to the 
economy.   However, it may prove politically difficult to implement tax cuts that increase 
economic efficiency.  The revenues raised could just as easily be spent in activities that 
reduce, or have no impact on, economic efficiency as on activities that improve it.  
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4. Long-term Incentives:  Will the program induce key sectors to 
begin investing in low-emission technologies and practices? 
Most climate change analysts agree that moderating the increase in atmospheric 
concentrations of GHGs ultimately will require a substantial transformation in the way 
that industrialized countries like the United States produce and use energy.49  Near-term 
policy choices will have a major impact on the cost of such a long-term effort.  The 
reason is that energy-producing and energy-using technologies involve long-term capital 
investments that are not readily converted to other uses.50  Therefore, a domestic program 
needs to send a credible long-term signal to key sectors of the economy that encourages a 
shift toward lower-carbon technologies and lower-emitting practices.  A domestic 
program that leaves certain sectors uncovered could result in those sectors “locking in” 
higher-emitting technologies and practices, potentially increasing the cost of achieving 
more substantial economy-wide GHG reductions in the future.51
C. Administrative Feasibility:  Can the program be administered and 
does it minimize administrative and transaction costs?
A key consideration in designing any regulatory program is whether it is feasible 
to administer.  A program that is infeasible to administer will be both environmentally 
ineffective and economically inefficient.  One key feasibility consideration is minimizing 
administrative costs – including the costs of designing the program and the costs of 
implementing it, both for the regulated firm, which must bear reporting or other costs, 
and for the regulator.  Administrative costs are a function of the number of regulated 
firms, the availability of needed data about those firms, and the complexity of the 
regulatory program.  In addition, program designs that build upon existing and familiar 
programs will impose smaller implementation costs and less difficulty for the regulator 
49 See BATTELLE GLOBAL ENERGY TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY PROGRAM, GLOBAL ENERGY TECHNOLOGY 
STRATEGY:  ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE (2000).
50 See D. SMITH ET AL., supra note 37, at 50. 
51 See R. LEMPERT ET AL., PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CAPITAL CYCLES AND THE TIMING 
OF CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY (Nov. 2002), available at http://www.pewclimate.org (discussing the 
importance of capital investment cycles in determining the timing and stringency of climate change 
policies.)
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and the firms to be regulated than programs that represent a new departure.  Finally, in 
designing market-based regulatory programs, careful attention needs to be given to 
avoiding unnecessary program complexities and uncertainties that run up participants’ 
transaction costs.52
Another particularly important administrative criterion for a climate change 
policy is adaptability, given the necessary duration of any effort to stabilize 
concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere.  A U.S. climate change policy framework 
needs to be able to evolve over time to accommodate adjustments in the emission 
reduction commitments as new information becomes available and as the U.S. economy 
changes.  In addition, because stabilization of GHG concentrations ultimately will require 
global efforts, the policy framework will have to be flexible enough to provide for 
coordination with other countries.  
D. Distributional Equity:  Is the burden of compliance with the program 
fairly apportioned?
Another consideration in designing a regulatory program is how its costs are 
distributed across society.  Even the most cost-effective program design may be 
unacceptable if its costs are distributed in such a way that is perceived to be unfair.  
All other things being equal, a regulatory program that aims to reduce GHG 
emissions will tend to impose its largest costs on firms and households that produce fossil 
fuels or are heavily dependent on them.  A GHG regulatory program also will tend to be 
relatively more costly for low-income individuals because they spend a greater 
proportion of their total income on energy.53
Some regulatory programs provide opportunities for modifying these 
distributional impacts.  For example, in an emissions trading program, the government 
could allocate allowances on a cost-free basis to firms that would bear the brunt of 
52
 Programs that involve substantial redistribution of income or wealth (e.g., auction or tax type 
programscan trigger substantial lobbying and litigation expenditures.
53 See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, WHO GAINS AND WHO PAYS UNDER CARBON-ALLOWANCE 
TRADING?  THE DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE POLICY DESIGNS 20 (June 2000). 
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regulatory compliance costs.  Alternatively, the government could auction allowances 
and use the revenue to compensate those particularly burdened by the regulatory program 
through targeted tax breaks or lump-sum payments.  Emissions tax programs hold similar 
revenue recycling potential.   
E. Political Acceptability:  Are there elements of program design that 
affect its political acceptability?
Program designs that promise relatively greater environmental effectiveness, 
lower costs, and a more equitable distribution of regulatory burdens will be more likely to 
obtain more political support than other designs.  However, the U.S. experience with 
environmental and energy policy suggests that other factors also affect a program’s 
political acceptability.  Indeed, considerations of political acceptability may lead policy-
makers away from what could otherwise be an optimal program design with respect to 
environmental effectiveness, cost, and equity.54
For example, 25 years of environmental and energy policy experience suggests 
that it is difficult to gain public support for a program that relies principally on direct 
increases in the price of energy – either through taxes or regulatory measures – even 
where such a program arguably is more cost-effective or will result in a more equitable 
distribution of regulatory burdens than other approaches.55  Even in times of most 
compelling national circumstances, such as the 1973 Arab oil embargo, Congress was 
unwilling to use energy price increases to rein in consumer demand.  On the other hand, 
54 See Nathaniel O. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 
HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 313 (1998). 
55
 The initial U.S. reaction to the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74 was to impose price controls on petroleum 
rather than to allow prices to rise to world market levels.  The Ford Administration in 1975 submitted 
legislative proposals to reduce vulnerability to OPEC action through a mix of pricing policies (decontrol of 
oil and natural gas prices), encouragement of U.S. fossil-fuel production, establishment of a strategic 
petroleum reserve (SPR) and energy labeling of (but not standards for) efficiency of consumer products.  
The Congress responded by enacting the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, which mandated efficiency 
standards for automobiles and appliances and established the SPR, but which maintained price controls on 
oil and natural gas.  In the late 1970s, the Carter Administration was faced with severe interstate natural gas 
shortages and continuing vulnerability of the U.S. to oil supply interruptions. The Administration proposed 
to increase gasoline taxes, impose new taxes on crude oil, natural gas, and petroleum products, strengthen 
energy efficiency standards, and ultimately to remove price controls on new natural gas.  Congress balked 
at the energy taxes, but enacted most of the Carter regulatory programs.  Clinton’s BTU tax of 1993 
suffered a fate similar to the Carter tax proposals – it died.
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program designs involving emissions trading or emissions charges offer the opportunity 
to develop what may be a politically-attractive policy package, i.e., using the revenue 
raised from regulation of GHG emissions as a basis for reducing taxes on income.
V. Evaluating Different Approaches to Regulating Domestic GHG Emissions
Using the criteria developed above, we evaluate three principal approaches to 
regulating domestic GHG emissions: (1) an emissions trading (“cap-and-trade”) program; 
(2) a GHG tax program; or (3) a sectoral hybrid program combining a large-source cap-
and-trade program with product efficiency standards.  Each approach presents its own 
design choices (e.g., whether a cap-and-trade program should be “upstream” or 
“downstream.”)
A. Emissions Trading (“Cap-and-Trade”) Programs
1. Overview
A conventional cap-and-trade program establishes an economy-wide or sectoral 
“cap” on emissions (in terms of tons per year or other compliance period), and allocates 
or auctions tradable allowances (i.e., the right to emit a ton of GHGs) to GHG emission 
sources or to fuel suppliers.  The total number of allowances is equal to the cap.  A 
“downstream” cap-and-trade program applies to sources of GHG emissions and requires 
them to surrender allowances equal to their emissions.  An “upstream” program applies to 
fuel suppliers and requires them to surrender allowances equivalent to the carbon content 
of fossil fuels they supply.  Cap-and-trade programs are best suited to regulation of 
emissions sources that can be readily measured and monitored.  In the GHG context, such 
sources include almost all sources of CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel combustion as well 
as many sources of other GHG emissions.  Other types of sources can be regulated on an 
“opt in” or project basis, or through supplemental regulation.  [See Box 1.]  The trading 
feature of a cap-and-trade program authorizes regulated firms (or anyone else) to buy, 
sell, or hold allowances.  
In a well-functioning emissions trading market, allowances will end up distributed 
among firms that need them in a way that minimizes the cost of reducing emissions.  For 
example, in a conventional downstream cap-and-trade program, firms subject to the 
program buy allowances if their costs of reducing emissions – referred to as their costs of 
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“abatement” – exceed the allowance price.  Firms sell allowances if their abatement costs 
are lower than the allowance price.  Trades continue in this way until firms are indifferent 
between buying and selling allowances – or, in other words, between abating one more 
ton of CO2 or emitting an additional ton.  At this point, the program has equalized 
marginal abatement costs across the economy, and the final distribution of allowances 
(and abatement) throughout the economy reflects, in theory, the least-cost outcome.56
A GHG emissions trading program could incorporate all forms of “what,” 
“where,” and “when” flexibility, discussed above.  Each firm affected by a GHG 
emissions trading program could reduce its need for allowances or exposure to higher 
energy costs by adopting its lowest-cost means of abatement.  Firms also would have 
incentives to develop new technologies or practices to reduce emissions or increase their 
energy efficiency.  A U.S. domestic cap-and-trade program could also be integrated with 
emerging cap-and-trade programs in other countries and (if the parties so provided) with 
an international regime such as the Kyoto Protocol.57
A cap-and-trade program can be extended beyond energy-related sources of CO2
emissions by directly regulating: (1) sources of non-CO2 GHGs and/or (2) LULUCF 
activities that emit or remove CO2.  Some GHG sources and sinks, however, may not be 
amenable to regulation through such an approach because their emissions may be too 
difficult to measure (for purposes of setting a cap and allocating allowances) or monitor 
(for purposes of enforcement).  
56 See Robert N. Stavins, Policy Instruments for Climate Change:  How Can National Governments 
Address a Global Problem?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 293, 305 (1997).
57
 Crediting Kyoto instruments (i.e., Assigned Amount Units, Emission Reduction Units, Certified 
Emission Reductions, and Removal Units) in a U.S. domestic program appears feasible.  In addition, the 
Protocol does not appear to prohibit countries from hosting emission reduction projects outside the Kyoto 
regime.  Accordingly, a U.S. program could have its own project-based crediting mechanism for 
international projects.  However, there does not appear to be any way that U.S. firms could sell U.S. 
emission reduction credits or allowances to Kyoto party countries for use in the Kyoto regime unless the 
United States becomes a party to the Protocol.  See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22; the Marrakech Accords and the Marrakech 
Declaration, available at http://www.unfccc.de.  See also DANIEL BODANSKY, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE, LINKING U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE STRATEGIES (Apr. 2002),
available at http://www.pewclimate.org.
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In some cases, these sources and sinks could be incorporated into the cap-and-
trade program on a project-by-project basis (“project-based crediting”).  Under project-
based crediting, a firm could earn emissions “credits” by undertaking a climate change 
mitigation project at a source or sink not otherwise subject to the cap-and-trade program.  
To earn credits, a project would have to meet certain criteria.  For example, the firm 
would have to provide for adequate measurement and monitoring and demonstrate that 
the project achieves reductions or removals beyond a baseline or “business-as-usual” 
scenario.  The firm also would have to establish that the project would not simply shift 
emitting activities from the project site to another, unregulated site (an effect commonly 
referred to as “leakage”).  Credits earned for projects could be fully fungible with 
allowances in the emissions trading market.  An example of this kind of project-based 
crediting mechanism is the Kyoto Protocol’s “Clean Development Mechanism.”  From a 
cost-effectiveness standpoint, project-based crediting is inferior to a cap-and-trade 
approach because it entails higher transaction costs.  Project-based crediting, however, 
may be the only way to incorporate certain difficult-to-measure sources into a market-
based program.  
In addition to these forms of “what” and “where” flexibility, a GHG emissions 
trading program could provide for “when” flexibility by allowing for banking and 
borrowing.  Firms required to surrender allowances to cover their emissions or the carbon 
content of fuel supplied could be authorized to bank surplus allowances for use in a later 
compliance period.  Some form of limited borrowing (using future allowances to cover 
current emissions) also could be considered. Borrowers could be required to repay with 
“interest,” i.e., additional allowances. 
BOX 1:  Multi-Gas Approaches to GHG Regulation
While most proposals for domestic GHG regulatory programs have focused on 
addressing CO2 emissions from the energy sector, research suggests that a multi-gas 
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approach could achieve comparable results at substantially lower cost.58   Designing a 
multi-gas program involves consideration of two factors:  :  (1) determining the relative 
value of reductions of different kinds of gases, and (2) measurement and monitoring of 
reductions.59
A multi-gas regulatory program requires a formula that will allow policy-makers 
to accurately weigh the value of, for example, reducing a ton of CH4 relative to reducing 
a ton of CO2.  The Global Warming Potential (GWP) formula is the “exchange rate” 
approach most widely used at this time, but has been criticized for not being the right 
measure for determining the optimal tradeoffs among gases.60
Another issue for policy-makers is the extent to which emissions from different 
sources of non-CO2 GHGs can be accurately measured and monitored.  Ease of 
measurement and monitoring dictates whether sources could be regulated through a cap-
and-trade program or whether some other policy approach is necessary.
Sources of the synthetic gases (HFCs, PFCs, and SF6) are good candidates for 
inclusion in a cap-and-trade program.  The gases are produced by a relatively small 
number of large firms and because the gases themselves are sold (rather than emitted as 
58 For a more extensive discussion of issues and options involved in multi-gas approaches to climate 
change policy, See JOHN M. REILLY, ET AL., PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, MULTI-GAS 
CONTRIBUTORS TO GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (forthcoming 2003).
59 The European Commission has determined that the complexities of including sources of non-CO2 GHGs 
into a cap-and-trade program are significant enough that it has decided not to include such sources in at 
least the first phase (2005-2007) of the European Union cap-and-trade program. See Directive 2003/87/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse 
gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, 
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/climat/emission.htm.  On the other hand, the UK is 
including all six major GHGs in its trading program.
60
  The GWP formula has come under significant criticism from a number of quarters for not accurately 
representing the full relative benefits of reductions in the different GHGs.  See John M. Reilly et al., supra
note 62 (citing several studies).  These studies assert that the GWP formula is flawed because it compares 
the different gases solely on their extent of their radiative forcing—the strength of their effects on the 
climate system—and their residence life in the atmosphere out to 100 years.  Such an approach omits 
important information.  For example, it does not take into account climate effects resulting from the 
interaction of GHGs nor does it account for their non-climate environmental effects.  Some studies also cite 
problems with the GWP formula’s approach to time.  On the one hand, the formula equates effects taking 
place in 20 years with effects taking place in 100 years.  On the other hand, effects taking place after 100 
years are omitted altogether.  Research to address these issues continues.  
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by-product), these firms already have incentives to monitor them.  Unlike the industrial 
gases, industrial emissions of nitrous oxide are a by-product and therefore not currently 
measured by most firms, but because the sources are large and concentrated, they likely 
could develop adequate measurement and monitoring capabilities in order to be included 
in a cap-and-trade program.  For example, in the 1990s, DuPont implemented voluntary 
controls on its nitrous oxide emissions and developed measuring and monitoring systems 
to calculate the results; it achieved a nearly 50 percent reduction in its GHG emissions.61
While not as amenable to regulation through a cap-and-trade program, a domestic 
program could address certain sources of methane through a project-based crediting 
mechanism.  For example, firms could earn credit for achieving reductions in methane 
from coal mines and large landfills through the installation of devices that collect and sell 
the gas for energy purposes.62
Other cases are more difficult, such as agricultural sources of methane and nitrous 
oxide.  These sources are highly diffuse and, for now, it is difficult to measure and 
monitor the effects of any mitigation activities.  Policy-makers likely will have to rely on 
regulatory standards, incentives, or the publication of “best practices” to address these 
sources.  
BOX 2:  Integrating Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry 
(LULUCF) Activities into a Domestic GHG Regulatory Program
LULUCF activities offer a range of highly cost-effective climate change 
mitigation opportunities.  For example, applying “best management practices” and new 
61
 For more information on DuPont’s climate change program, see
http://www.dupont.com/corp/news/position/global_climate.html.  
62 An Environmental Law Institute study suggests that it would be feasible to include large landfills and 
coal mines in a cap-and-trade program.  See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, IMPLEMENTING AN 
EMISSIONS CAP AND ALLOWANCE TRADING SYSTEM FOR GREENHOUSE GASES:  LESSONS LEARNED FROM 
THE ACID RAIN PROGRAM16-19 (1997).
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technologies on U.S. croplands potentially could sequester 60 to 200 MMTC.63  Slowing 
deforestation of forests – particularly tropical forests – could address a source of 20-25% 
of annual global CO2 emissions.64 To be sure, the capacity of forests to absorb CO2
emissions is not infinite, and any forest eventually will start to release sequestered carbon 
emissions back to the atmosphere.  However, in the near-term, LULUCF activities have 
the potential to achieve substantial mitigation benefits at relatively low cost, allowing 
time for the development and deployment of the next-generation clean energy 
technologies that will be needed to achieve deeper cuts in emissions. LULUCF activities 
also can offer many side-benefits, including biodiversity protection, improvement of 
agricultural productivity, and economic development for rural communities. 
Including any but the very largest domestic landowners in a cap-and-trade 
program does not appear to be feasible currently.  Land ownership is too diffuse, 
measuring emissions impacts of LULUCF activities is too resource-intensive, and the 
relation between practices and emissions varies widely depending on a multiplicity of 
local conditions.  However, it would be feasible to credit a variety of discrete domestic 
and international LULUCF activities through a project-based crediting mechanism.
Accommodating LULUCF activities in a project-based mechanism will require 
attention to definitions and rules.  As with other types of climate change mitigation 
projects, LULUCF projects should meet criteria for baselines, measurement and 
monitoring, and leakage.  At this point in time, some types of LULUCF projects present 
relatively greater measurement challenges than projects in the energy sector.  LULUCF 
project criteria also will have to address the risk of reversibility or “non-permanence.”   
Unlike energy projects, the carbon benefits of some types of LULUCF projects can be 
reversed if there is a later natural or human disturbance to the site, such as a forest fire.65
63 See PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, AGRICULTURE’S ROLE IN ADDRESSING CLIMATE 
CHANGE (Oct. 2001), available at http://www.pewclimate.org.
64 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, 
AND WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION, SPECIAL REPORT ON LAND USE, LAND-USE CHANGE, AND 
FORESTRY 3.5.,4.1 (2001).
65
  For a discussion of the issue of permanence, see B. SCHLAMADINGER AND G. MARLAND, PEW CENTER 
ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, LAND USE & GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 31 (2000).
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Policy-makers will have to develop an approach that adequately accounts for the 
reversibility risk of LULUCF projects. In developing a policy approach, policy-makers 
can draw important lessons from the forestry industry, which has developed over time a 
range of sophisticated practices and insurance instruments to protect its investments in 
forestry assets.66   A number of approaches have been proposed to address the 
reversibility issue, including making project proponents fully liable for later carbon 
losses; encouraging project proponents to obtain insurance; encouraging project 
proponents to rely on a pool of forestry projects; discounting of LULUCF credits; and 
making LULUCF credits time-limited.
Certain types of LULUCF activities appear particularly promising, including 
cropland and grazing land management; returning cropland to grassland or forest cover; 
conservation of threatened international forests; dedication of existing private domestic 
forestland to permanent forest status; and reforesting or replanting with native species 
lands that were historically forested but have not been in forest for a decade or more.  
Creating a GHG emissions trading program involves three fundamental design 
decisions that build upon this basic model.67  Policy-makers need to determine which 
firms will be required to hold allowances for compliance, how allowances initially will be 
allocated, and whether the program will enforce a strict quantitative emissions target or 
adopt a price-based “safety-valve” approach (i.e,, an approach that provides that  permits 
will not exceed a specified cost threshold).  Each design decision has various implications 
for the trading program’s effectiveness, cost, administrative feasibility, distributional 
consequences, and political acceptability. 
66 See George H. Weyerhauser, Jr., and Robert S. Prolman, Climate Change:  A Common Sense View From 
the Forest, in U.S. POLICY ON CLIMATE CHANGE:  WHAT NEXT? (John A. Riggs ed.) (2002). 
67 See U.S. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, AN EVALUATION OF CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAMS FOR 
REDUCING U.S. CARBON EMISSIONS (June 2001) (hereinafter U.S. CBO, EVALUATION OF CAP-AND-TRADE 
PROGRAMS).  
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2. Who is the regulated firm?
A key step in designing a GHG emissions trading program is determining who are 
to be the regulated firms – that is, the firms that will be required to hold allowances for 
compliance purposes.  As noted above, there are two basic options:  a “downstream” 
approach and an “upstream” approach.  A downstream program would require firms to 
hold allowances to cover their GHG emissions.  An upstream approach, by contrast, 
would limit emissions by requiring fuel suppliers to hold allowances for the carbon 
content of fuel they sell to downstream emitters.  A limit on the carbon content of fuel 
equates to a limit on CO2 emissions because, with a few minor exceptions, all of the 
carbon in fuel sold downstream is fully combusted as CO2.68  Programs that combine 
downstream and upstream approaches also are possible.
(a) Downstream Cap-and-Trade
A downstream program has the political and administrative advantages of 
familiarity.  The CAA Acid Rain for electricity generators is widely regarded as a success 
and could be relatively easily adapted for GHG trading for those firms.  A number of 
extant proposals for a domestic GHG regulatory program have focused on the 
establishment of a CO2 cap-and-trade program covering the electricity-generating 
sector.69  In addition, the European Council has approved the establishment of a 
downstream cap-and-trade program for the member countries of the European Union.70
68
 An upstream program would have to be designed in such a way as to exempt the few non-fuel uses of 
fossil fuels.  These include asphalt, lubricating oil, and waxes.  CENTER FOR CLEAN AIR POLICY, U.S. 
CARBON EMISSIONS TRADING:  DESCRIPTION OF AN UPSTREAM APPROACH 9 (March 1998), available at
http://www.ccap.org (hereinafter CCAP, DESCRIPTION OF AN UPSTREAM APPROACH).   
69
 These proposals include four bills introduced in the 108th Congress and the McCain/Lieberman bill.  See
S.843, H.R. 2042, S.366.  See supra note 38.  In addition, the State of New Hampshire has passed 
legislation establishing a “multi-emissions” program with CO2 trading for electric power generators in the 
state.  See H.B. 284-FN (effective July 1, 2002).  The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has promulgated 
regulations establishing a similar program.  See Emissions Standards for Power Plants, 310 Mass Regs. 
Code 310, § 7.29 (2001), available at http://www.state.ma.us/dep/bwp/daqc/files/regs/729final.doc.  Under 
the “Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative,” governors of eight States in the Northeast have committed to the 
establishment of a cap-and-trade program for CO2 emissions by power plants.  Their goal is to establish 
such a program by April 2005.  See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, available at 
http://www.rggi.org/index.htm.   A paper by the Progressive Policy Institute outlines a proposal for a 
downstream cap-and-trade program including not only electric power generators but also other large 
industrial sources.  See J. NAIMON AND D. KNOPMAN, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INSTITUTE, REFRAMING THE 
CLIMATE CHANGE DEBATE:  THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BUILD A DOMESTIC MARKET NOW FOR 
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However, a pure downstream approach to regulating U.S. GHGs has a 
fundamental drawback: it could not feasibly be applied on an economy-wide basis.  
Sources of CO2, the primary GHG, number in the hundreds of millions.  The sources 
include not only large facilities, such as those in the electricity generating sector, but also 
households and vehicles.  The administrative costs of allowance allocation, monitoring, 
and enforcement for so many sources, especially the small ones, would likely be 
prohibitive.
Realistically, a downstream trading program could encompass only a subset of 
emissions sources, e.g., electricity generators and other large stationary sources.  While 
such a large-source downstream program would not be hindered by the administrative 
impediments associated with an economy-wide downstream program, it could reach, at 
most, less than half of the nation’s CO2 emissions (primarily because it would not reach 
emissions from the transportation and buildings sectors).71 A limited downstream 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS (Nov. 1, 1999), available at http://www.ppionline.org; D. 
KNOPMAN AND J. NAIMON, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INSITUTE, HOW A DOMESTIC GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS TRADING MARKET COULD WORK IN PRACTICE:  A SUPPLEMENT TO THE NOVEMBER 1999 
POLICY REPORT “REFRAMING THE CLIMATE CHANGE DEBATE” (Mar. 1, 2000), available at
http://www.ppionline.org.  In a study for the World Wildlife Fund, the Tellus Institute analyzed and 
recommended a downstream cap-and-trade program for the electricity-generating sector with a range of 
standards and incentive programs.  ALISON BAILIE ET AL., WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, TELLUS INSTITUTE AND 
STOCKHOLM ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTE – BOSTON CENTER, THE AMERICAN WAY TO THE KYOTO 
PROTOCOL:   AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS TO REDUCE CARBON POLLUTION (July 2001), available at
http://www.wwf-us.org.  Finally, three different coalitions of electric power generators have proposed 
various versions of a multi-emissions program with CO2 trading for generators.  See New Utility Proposal 
Advocates Voluntary Carbon Cuts, INSIDE EPA (Sept. 7, 2001) (describing proposal of the coalition 
“Energy for a Clean Air Future,” which consists of PPL, Reliant, TECO Energy, Transalta, and Wisconsin 
Energy); Competing Utility Emissions Plans May Create Congressional Hurdle, INSIDE EPA (Aug. 17, 
2001) (describing proposals of the coalition “Clean Power Group” (consisting of NiSource, Enron, Calpine, 
El Paso, and Trigen) and the coalition “Clean Energy Group” (consisting of Conectiv, Consolidated Edison, 
Northeast Utilities, PG&E National Energy Group and Sempra Energy)).
70 See Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 
establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending 
Council Directive 96/61/EC, supra note 63. 
71 See CENTER FOR CLEAN AIR POLICY, U.S. CARBON EMISSIONS TRADING:  SOME OPTIONS THAT INCLUDE 
DOWNSTREAM SOURCES at 2, Table ES-1 (1998), available at http://www.ccap.org (hereinafter CCAP, 
OPTIONS THAT INCLUDE DOWNSTREAM SOURCES).  The Center for Clean Air Policy also has examined 
options for extending the coverage of a downstream trading to at least some portion of transportation sector 
emissions by requiring automakers to surrender allowances for emissions imputed to new vehicles they sell 
or for all vehicles on the road.  See id. at 30-37;  see also S. WINKELMAN ET AL., CENTER FOR CLEAN AIR 
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program would likely be more costly (in $/ton) than a more comprehensive emissions 
trading program that met the same reduction target.  The full burden of achieving the 
emissions objective would fall on electricity generators and large industrial sources.  
Low-cost abatement opportunities in other sectors could be lost.72  In addition, a limited 
downstream program could lead to leakage – that is, firms would have incentives to shift 
production from regulated to exempt facilities.73 For example, if the program applied 
only to industrial sources above a certain size, output (and, therefore, emissions) might 
shift to sources below the size cutoff.  Finally, opting for a large-source downstream cap-
and-trade program instead of a program with economy-wide coverage would raise the 
long-term cost of achieving more substantial emission reductions because the sectors left 
unregulated would lack incentives to begin investing in low-carbon technologies and 
instead might lock in higher-emitting technologies and practices. 
A downstream cap-and-trade program that focused on electricity generators and 
large industrial sources still could be designed to achieve substantial emission reductions.  
The electricity-generating sector accounts for approximately 40 percent of the U.S. CO2
emissions and 10 percent of world emissions.  The choice to start with a limited 
downstream program would not necessarily preclude moving to a more comprehensive 
upstream program later. The second stage of the program could be an upstream program 
for other sectors of the economy.  Or, policy-makers could shift the point of regulation 
from electricity generators to upstream fuel suppliers (in which case, the former could 
sell any of their banked allowances to the latter).  However, such a transition may be 
difficult because program participants may develop vested interests in the persistence of 
the program in a particular form.      
POLICY, TRANSPORTATION AND DOMESTIC GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADING (April 2000), available 
at http://www.ccap.org.
72
 Some abatement opportunities in uncapped sectors could be made available through  project-based 
crediting, but, as discussed above, project-based crediting entails higher transaction costs than a cap-and-
trade approach.
73 See U.S. CBO, EVALUATION OF CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAMS, supra note 67, at 6;  CCAP, OPTIONS 
THAT INCLUDE DOWNSTREAM SOURCES, supra note 71, at 14.  
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(b) Upstream Cap-and-Trade
While a realistic downstream emissions trading program could reach at most 
about 50 percent of U.S. emissions, it would be feasible to address virtually all sources of 
U.S. CO2 emissions through an upstream emissions trading program.74  The Center for 
Clean Air Policy (CCAP) has found that an upstream program involving fewer than 2000 
regulated facilities – approximately the same number of regulated facilities that are 
subject to the CAA Acid Rain program – could reach virtually all of the CO2 emissions in 
the U.S. economy.75  These 2000 facilities would include a combination of petroleum 
refineries, oil importers, natural gas pipelines, natural gas processing plants, coal 
preparation plants, and certain coal mines where the production bypasses preparation 
plants.  Fuel data is generally available for these firms, thereby easing the reporting 
burden on the firms and the monitoring and enforcement burden on the government.76
Like a downstream system, an upstream emissions trading program would give 
downstream energy users the incentives and the flexibility to implement the most cost-
effective means of reducing their emissions.77  However, the incentive would take a 
74
 Policy-makers also might be able to address some portion of emissions of the industrial GHGs through 
upstream controls on firms that manufacture the gases or on firms that use the gases in products.  This 
paper generally will discuss the upstream approach in the context of CO2 regulation.
75
 CCAP, DESCRIPTION OF AN UPSTREAM APPROACH, supra note 68, at 6-7.  Americans for Equitable 
Climate Solutions, with support from Resources for the Future, has proposed an upstream cap-and-trade 
program, called the “Sky Trust.”  See AMERICANS FOR EQUITABLE CLIMATE SOLUTIONS, SKY TRUST 
INITIATIVE:  ECONOMY-WIDE PROPOSAL TO REDUCE U.S. CARBON EMISSIONS (Dec. 2000), available at
http://www.aecs-inc.org/index2.html; RICHARD D. MORGENSTERN, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, 
REDUCING CARBON EMISSIONS AND LIMITING COSTS (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.rff.org.  In its 
evaluation of four options for a U.S. GHG cap-and-trade program, the Congressional Budget Office gave 
an option modeled on the Sky Trust the highest ratings.  See U.S. CBO, EVALUATION OF CAP-AND-TRADE 
PROGRAMS, supra note 67.  The proposal also has received favorable notices in The Economist and The 
New Republic. See A Novel Approach to Tackling Climate Change Could Satisfy Economists and 
Environmentalists Alike, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 14, 2002; Gregg Easterbrook, How W. Can Save Himself 
on Global Warming, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 23, 2001, at 22.
76
 Designers of an upstream program would have to contend with a range of measurement “special cases,” 
including cross-border flows of fuels and bunker fuels used for aircraft. 
77
 At least further two design questions arise with an upstream program:  (1) How can the program reward 
facilities that “capture” CO2 emissions at the stack? and (2)  Would an upstream program concentrate 
power over the allowance market in the hands of a few large firms?  With regard to carbon capture, the 
question arises because an upstream program would regulate carbon at the fuel level rather than at the 
emissions level.  For this reason, sources would not have an incentive to implement carbon capture because 
it would not lower the price they pay for fossil fuels.  However, it would be possible to design an upstream 
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different form.  Instead of facing limits on their emissions, downstream sources would 
face limits on the physical availability of carbon-based fuels, which, in turn, would be 
reflected in fuel price increases.  Theoretically, downstream firms and consumers should 
respond to this price signal in the same way as they would to a requirement to hold 
allowances directly – that is, under an upstream emissions trading program, the cap on 
fuel carbon would induce downstream sources to adopt the least-cost mix of emission 
reduction measures.  Whether in practice the impacts on fuel use, technical innovation 
and efficiency will be the same is not possible to predict.  But, because an upstream 
emissions trading program feasibly, though indirectly, would reach all sources of CO2 
emissions, such a program arguably could achieve any given emissions reduction 
objective at less cost than a large-source downstream program.
Some commentators argue that an optimal domestic program would combine an 
upstream cap-and-trade program with enhanced product standards.  Their rationale is 
that, from a societal view, consumers often do not respond efficiently to changes in the 
price of energy.  For example, studies suggest that drivers do not take into account fuel 
costs savings over the entire useful life of a vehicle in deciding what level of fuel 
cap-and-trade program such that downstream firms could earn project-based emissions credits for carbon 
capture activities and sell those credits to upstream firms.  This would introduce carbon capture activities 
into the program in much the same way that land-use activities might be introduced into either an upstream 
or downstream program.  With regard to the market power issue, the question arises because the petroleum 
industry currently is dominated by a small number of very large firms.  The concern is that, under an 
upstream program, one or more of these firms would receive the bulk of the allowances and thereby have 
the power to control prices by witholding its allowances from the market.  Such an outcome is highly 
unlikely for at least three reasons.  First, what determines the shape of the market is not the firms regulated 
under the policy but the allocation of allowances.  As discussed below, if policy-makers opted for an 
upstream cap-and-trade program and decided to distribute allowances with the aim of minimizing the 
impacts of the program, they likely would distribute most if not all of the allowances to downstream energy 
users, who would be paying higher fuel prices as a result of the upstream cap.  Alternatively, if policy-
makers opted to auction the allowances, petroleum industry titans would not have any particular advantage 
over any other bidder, e.g., firms from other industries, investment banks, etc. Second, even if allowances 
were distributed solely to the regulated upstream firms, it is unlikely that one or more of the major oil firms 
would receive enough allowances to exercise market power.  The use of petroleum products accounts for 
less than half of the total emissions associated with the combustion of fossil fuels.  See Table 1, infra p.___.  
Therefore, under such an allocation scenario, even the dominant petroleum firms would receive a relatively 
small share of the total allowances.  Finally, policy-makers could migitate any potential for market power 
by providing for international emissions trading, credits for reductions in non-CO2 gases, and credit for 
reductions from unregulated sources.  These “what” flexibility measures would expand the market and 
thereby diminish the ability of any individual firm or firms to exercise market power.  
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economy they want from a new vehicle.78  This potential failure of some end-users to 
respond efficiently to a price signal does not affect the environmental effectiveness of an 
upstream cap-and-trade program because such a program imposes an absolute cap on the 
carbon content of fuel used in the economy.  On the other hand, if consumers do not 
respond efficiently to the price signal, a disproportionate share of the burden of meeting 
an emissions cap could fall onto firms in the electricity-generation and industrial sectors, 
potentially diminishing the overall cost-effectiveness of the program.  
These commentators argue that supplementing the upstream program with 
efficiency standards – such as modified CAFE requirements – could address these 
“market failures” by forcing more energy-efficient products into the marketplace.  (See 
discussion below).  For example, the program originally proposed by Senators McCain 
and Lieberman in January 2003 would have established an upstream cap on 
transportation sector emissions, but also incorporated incentives for automakers to sell 
more fuel-efficient cars.79  (The latter element was removed from the version of the 
McCain-Lieberman bill that was voted on in the Senate in October 2003.)
Of course, any economy-wide upstream approach implies that households will see 
price increases in gasoline and home heating fuels.  Policy-makers concerned about 
shielding households from such price increases might prefer alternatives to an economy-
wide approach, such as a downstream cap-and-trade program (which would shield 
consumers from fuel price but not electricity price increases) or a program that combines 
78 See U.S. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING GASOLINE CONSUMPTION:  THREE POLICY 
OPTIONS 17, Box 3 (Nov. 2002), available at http://www.cbo.gov; DAVID L. GREENE AND ANDREAS 
SCHAFER, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM 
U.S. TRANSPORTATION 22-23 (forthcoming 2003); and National Research Council, supra note 29, at 64-65.
79
 The program originally proposed by Senators McCain and Lieberman would have capped the carbon 
content in fuels used for transportation purposes and would allocate a portion of the allowances to 
petroleum importers and refiners.  At the same time, program would have encouraged the production and 
sale of more fuel-efficient cars by providing that an automaker that over-complied with the CAFE 
standards by 20 percent or more could convert its excess CAFE credits into “registered GHG credits.”  The 
automaker then would have been able to sell these credits into the cap-and-trade program.  Acknowledging 
that an improvement in fuel economy also would free up allowances for use by regulated petroleum 
importers and refiners, the McCain/Lieberman program would have provided that anytime an automaker 
was awarded GHG credits, the government would have to remove a corresponding amount of allowances 
from the allotment to the transportation sector.  This approach avoids a “double-counting” outcome. 
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a downstream program with product efficiency standards.  In assessing these alternatives, 
however, it is important to keep in mind that program designs that shield households 
from overt price increases for gasoline and home heating fuels do not necessarily shield 
them from higher costs.  Alternative programs would put greater pressure on other sectors 
to achieve the emissions target; their compliance costs would come back to households in 
the form of higher prices for electricity and other goods and services.  Indeed, because 
alternative designs are less efficient, the overall costs faced by households likely would 
be higher under such designs.  Additionally, any program design that fails to provide a 
key sector with incentives to start shifting to lower-emitting practices and products 
increases the costs of achieving deeper emission reductions in the future.  It should be 
noted, finally, that the impact of an upstream program on fuel prices can be controlled, 
either by starting with a moderate emissions cap or, as discussed in section V(a)(4) 
below, by incorporating a “safety valve” approach.  
(c) Upstream/Downstream 
Another approach is an upstream/downstream program that would use the design 
of the familiar Clean Air Act Acid Rain program for electricity generators, but would 
cover other sectors, such as the transportation sector, with an upstream program. The 
program proposed by Senators McCain and Lieberman also reflects such an 
upstream/downstream design.80  An upstream/downstream program would require 
upstream suppliers of fuel (refiners, gas pipelines, or processors) to hold allowances 
sufficient to cover the carbon content of fuel they deliver, subject to an exemption for 
deliveries to firms (such as electricity generators) that are subject to downstream 
regulation.  These downstream firms, in turn, would be required to hold allowances for 
their emissions.  
80
 Though it reflects an upstream/downstream design, the McCain/Lieberman bill  would omit any controls 
on natural gas or oil used for non-transportation purposes.  The Progressive Policy Institute has proposed an 
upstream/downstream program.  See JAN MAZUREK, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INSTITUTE, CAP CARBON 
DIOXIDE NOW (June 2002), available at http://www.ppionline.org.  CCAP also has outlined an 
upstream/downstream program option.  See T. HARGRAVE, CENTER FOR CLEAN AIR POLICY, AN 
UPSTREAM/DOWNSTREAM HYBRID APPROACH TO GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADING (June 2000), 
available at http://www.ccap.org.
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An upstream/downstream cap-and-trade that subjected electricity generators to 
downstream regulation and made all transactions for other uses subject to upstream 
regulation would end up with a somewhat greater number of regulated firms and would 
require a significantly more complex administrative system.81  For example, because 
electricity generators’ fossil fuel usage would be subject to a downstream allowance 
requirement, refiners’ sales of fuel oil to those generators would be exempt from the 
upstream allowance requirement.  This arrangement would make fuel destined for 
electricity generators less expensive than fuel destined for non-generators (such as 
truckers and building owners), thus creating an incentive for generators to buy fuel and 
resell it to others.  Regulatory controls would be needed to prevent such behavior.
 (d) Sectoral Hybrids
A fourth approach would combine a cap-and-trade program covering large 
sources with efficiency standards for smaller sources in the transportation sector and the 
residential and commercial buildings sector. This hybrid approach is discussed in Section 
IV.C.
3. How should allowances be allocated?
Once a cap is set for the cap-and-trade program and it is determined what firms 
will be regulated, then a number of allowances equal to the cap must be distributed for 
use within the economy.  The process for this distribution – the allowance allocation 
methodology – is likely to be the most difficult and potentially contentious issue in 
designing a cap-and-trade program.
There are two fundamental choices for allowance allocations: (1) distribution of 
allowances at no cost to firms affected by the regulatory program, or (2) an auction under 
which the government sells allowances to the highest bidder, and uses the proceeds to 
compensate affected firms, workers, or communities, to reduce taxes, or some 
combination of the above. If free distribution is chosen, then policy-makers will have to 
decide how to allocate allowances to firms or individuals.  Several allocation methods 
81
 The program elaborated by the CCAP for purposes of its analysis would encompass 8,400 facilities.  Id.
at 18.
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have been suggested, based on experience with existing electric generator cap-and-trade 
programs, including “grandfathering” (where allowances are allocated based on 
emissions prior to the start-up of the regulatory program) and a “generation performance 
standard” (which allocates allowances based on post-start-up electric output, measured 
either as of a date certain or on the basis of a periodic updating).82   If an auction is 
chosen, policy-makers will have to decide on the disposition of the revenues from the 
auction (“revenue recycling”).  Recycling alternatives include direct compensation to 
affected firms, workers, communities, or consumers, and reductions in taxes on labor and 
capital.
The choice between auction and free distribution, and the subsidiary choices 
respecting allocation method and revenue recycling, have important implications both for 
the one who bears the cost of the program and the program’s overall cost.  We look at 
these choices and their implications below. 
82
 A number of recent economic studies have been critical of the GPS approach, asserting that it has the 
potential to degrade the underlying cost-effectiveness of a cap-and-trade program.  See, e.g., DALLAS 
BURTRAW ET AL., THE EFFECT ON ASSET VALUE OF THE ALLOCATION OF CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSION 
ALLOWANCES (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 02-15, March 2002), available at
http://www.rff.org; DAVID HARRISON, JR., AND DANIEL B. RADOV, NATIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
ASSOCIATES, EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE INITIAL ALLOCATION MECHANISMS IN A EUROPEAN UNION 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS ALLOWANCE TRADING SCHEME, (March 2002) (prepared for DG 
Environment, European Commission), available at http://www.nera.org; DALLAS BURTRAW ET AL., THE 
EFFECT OF ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION ON THE COST OF CARBON EMISSION TRADING (Resources for the 
Future Discussion Paper 01-30, 2001), available at http://www.rff.org; LEE LANE, AMERICANS FOR 
EQUITABLE CLIMATE SOLUTIONS, ALLOCATION OF ALLOWANCES AND CONSUMER IMPACTS (May 2, 2001), 
available at http://www.aecs-inc.org/allocation.html; and CAROLYN FISCHER, RESOURCES FOR THE 
FUTURE, REBATING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY REVENUES: OUTPUT-BASED ALLOCATIONS AND TRADABLE 
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 01-22, 2001), available at
http://www.rff.org.  As between the two methods of free distribution (which appear to be applicable only if 
allowances were distributed to utilities in any event), the papers rate the grandfathering method higher than 
the GPS method.  The GPS approach, they assert, degrades the cost-effectiveness of a cap-and-trade 
program because it encourages relatively greater output from low-emitting generation (because utilities 
earn allowances on the basis of their generation) and relatively less conservation (because greater output 
means relatively lower electricity prices).  By contrast, the grandfathering approach does not distort the 
incentives created by the emissions cap.  Burtraw et al. further assert that utilities themselves should prefer 
alternatives to a GPS approach.  The reason is that the lower electricity prices resulting under the GPS 
approach erode the value of utility assets.  Indeed, Burtraw et al., conclude that utilities may be better off 
paying for allowances than receiving them for free on a GPS basis.  What explains this seeming paradox?  
Electricity prices are higher under an auction than under a GPS approach, resulting in greater revenues for 
utilities.  Therefore, so long as utilities can pass along most of the costs of allowance purchases to their 
customers, the relative benefits of higher revenues under the auction will exceed the greater costs.  
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(a) Free Distribution 
Under conventional “command-and-control” environmental regulation, the 
regulated firm bears the direct costs of controlling emissions down to an allowable level, 
but is not required to purchase its entitlement to allowable emissions.  Free distribution of 
allowances reaches a comparable result under market-based regulation by providing an 
initial free allocation of allowances to firms affected by the program.  This approach was 
used in the CAA Acid Rain program.   
A number of recent studies argue for a departure from the Acid Rain model in the 
context of a GHG cap-and-trade program, for several reasons.83  First, the studies indicate 
that the allowances created by a U.S. GHG trading program could have substantially 
greater value than Acid Rain allowances under the CAA.84  Second, these studies – if 
83 See, e.g., ANNE E. SMITH ET AL., IMPLICATIONS OF TRADING IMPLEMENTATION DESIGN FOR EQUITY-
EFFICIENCY TRADE-OFFS IN CARBON PERMIT ALLOCATIONS (CRA Working Paper, Dec. 2002) (document 
on file with the authors) (hereinafter CRA Study) ; DAVID HARRISON, JR., AND DANIEL B. RADOV, 
EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE INITIAL ALLOCATION MECHANISMS IN A EUROPEAN UNION GREENHOUSE 
GAS EMISSIONS ALLOWANCE TRADING SCHEME, supra note 82; DALLAS BURTRAW ET AL., THE EFFECT ON 
ASSET VALUE OF THE ALLOCATION OF CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSION ALLOWANCES, supra note 82; ANNE E. 
SMITH AND MARTIN T. ROSS, CENTER FOR CLEAN AIR POLICY, ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION:  WHO WINS 
AND LOSES UNDER A CARBON DIOXIDE CONTROL PROGRAM? (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.ccap.org
(hereinafter “CRA/CCAP”); DALLAS BURTRAW ET AL., THE EFFECT OF ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION ON THE 
COST OF CARBON EMISSION TRADING, supra note 82; LEE LANE, AMERICANS FOR EQUITABLE CLIMATE 
SOLUTIONS, ALLOCATION OF ALLOWANCES AND CONSUMER IMPACTS, supra note 82; LAWRENCE H. 
GOULDER, MITIGATING THE ADVERSE IMPACTS OF CO2 ABATEMENT POLICIES ON ENERGY-INTENSIVE 
INDUSTRIES (Sept. 2001) (document on file with authors); LAWRENCE H. GOULDER, CONFRONTING THE 
ADVERSE INDUSTRY IMPACTS OF CARBON DIOXIDE ABATEMENT POLICIES:  WHAT DOES IT COST?
(Resources for the Future Climate Issue Brief #23, 2000), available at http://www.rff.org.  
84
 For example, the CRA/CCAP study calculates that a U.S. program that aimed to achieve reductions on 
par with the U.S. target under the Kyoto Protocol would create U.S. allowances with a total present value 
of $1.8 trillion, which is roughly equivalent to 3 percent of the entire capital base of the United States.  See
ANNE E. SMITH AND MARTIN T. ROSS, ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION:  WHO WINS AND LOSES UNDER A 
CARBON DIOXIDE CONTROL PROGRAM?, supra note 82, at 21.  The U.S. Energy Information 
Administration has determined that full compliance with the Kyoto Protocol – if it were to be achieved 
through economy-wide trading aimed at achieving a more than a 30 percent reduction in emissions from 
BAU levels – would create allowances with a total annual value of approximately $450 billion in 2010 (in 
1997 dollars).  See U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, IMPACTS OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL, 
Report#:SR/OIAF/98-03 xxi (October 1998).  Even a more moderate program could create a high-value 
asset.  Economists from Resources for the Future assert that a program that aimed to achieve reductions 
from the electricity sector of only 6 percent from business-as-usual levels in 2012 (or a reduction in 35 
million metric tons from BAU levels) would establish a pool of allowances worth $14.8-23.6 billion per 
year.  By contrast, the Acid Rain program creates allowances worth a total of $2.7 billion in 2010. See
DALLAS BURTRAW ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, THE EFFECT OF ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION ON THE 
COST OF CARBON EMISSION TRADING 6 (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 01-31, Aug. 2001), 
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correct – indicate that free distribution of 100 percent of allowances to regulated firms 
would overcompensate them for their lost profits, because these firms can pass through to 
customers much of their costs of compliance.  One study found that for a stand-alone 
electric generator cap-and-trade program, free distribution of all allowances to the 
electricity generators would increase the sector’s net worth by 50 percent,85 implying - if 
the analysis is correct - that power producers in the aggregate would be better off with 
mandatory GHG regulation modeled on the Acid Rain program than they would be with 
no GHG regulation at all. Of course, the impacts on allowance recipients would depend 
on the method of free distribution and would vary on a firm-by- firm basis.  That is, 
utilities heavily reliant on coal would fare worse than utilities with natural gas, nuclear or 
renewable power plants.86  In addition, overcompensation might not be an issue for 
utilities subject to cost-of-service regulation if regulators were to require the allowances 
the utilities use to be valued at their cost (zero) rather than at their market value for 
purposes of setting customers’ rates.87
In any event, distribution of all of the allowances to firms subject to the cap would 
do nothing to alleviate the financial losses borne by firms and consumers not subject to 
the cap. For example, absent some compensation mechanism under any GHG cap-and-
trade program, both coal producers and owners of coal-fired power plants would suffer a 
available at http://www.rff.org.  These studies are cited to show a range of the estimates of the costs of a 
comprehensive U.S. program.  They do not reflect the judgment of the authors as to likely costs. 
85 See CRA/CCAP, supra note 83, at 5.
86 See DALLAS BURTRAW ET AL., THE EFFECT ON ASSET VALUES OF THE ALLOCATION OF CARBON DIOXIDE 
EMISSION ALLOWANCES, supra note 82; LAWRENCE H. GOULDER, MITIGATING THE ADVERSE IMPACTS OF 
CO2 ABATEMENT POLICIES ON ENERGY-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES, supra note 83, at17-18 (finding that, in a 
scenario in which all allowances are distributed gratis to fuel producers, coal industry profits rise by 155 
percent in 2002 and by 218 percent in 2025; coal industry equity values increase by a factor of seven over 
the same time period). 
87 See BURTRAW ET AL., EFFECT OF ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION, supra note 82.  Under cost-of-service 
regulation, a utility’s rates are set administratively based on the costs it incurs to provide electricity service.  
In the Acid Rain program, most regulators have treated grandfathered allowances as a zero-cost asset, 
because they were distributed to utilities for free.  Accordingly, utility regulators generally have not taken 
into account the opportunity cost of surrendering an Acid Rain allowance instead of selling it into the 
market.  As a result, most utilities have not been allowed to pass through these opportunity costs to their 
ratepayers in the form of higher electricity prices.  
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substantial proportion of the financial losses resulting from the emissions cap.  Yet, under 
a downstream program where allowances were allocated only to electricity generators 
subject to the cap, coal producers would receive no relief, even though – according to one 
study – their projected equity losses could be more than of 60 percent.88   Nor would this 
approach to allowance allocation provide any relief to coal miners who might face 
significant losses in income.  Similarly, under an upstream trading program, distribution 
of allowances to fuel transporters and processors subject to the cap would do nothing to 
address the financial losses of the electricity generators downstream from the point of 
regulation, which would be paying more for coal and natural gas.  And neither approach 
would address the impacts on other firms and on households, both of which would face 
significantly higher energy prices as a result of either an upstream or downstream trading 
program,89 or the likely reduction in federal tax revenues because of reduced levels of 
economic activity attributable to the program.90
For these reasons, these recent economic studies urge policy-makers to de-link the 
allocation of allowances from the incidence of regulation and to link it instead to 
economic losses attributable to the regulatory program.  In this regard, an important 
finding of the allowance allocation studies is that the government might need to distribute 
only a relatively small percentage (6 to 13 percent) of the total allowances to energy 
sector firms to eliminate their equity losses from an efficient upstream cap-and-trade 
program.91  If correct, this means the government could distribute the value of the balance 
of the allowances to achieve other ends, e.g., to assist burdened firms outside the energy 
88 See CRA/CCAP, supra note 83, at 25.
89
 Coal miners and coal mining communitiers could be particularly hard hit by a GHG regulation program.  
See JIM BARRETT, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, WORKER TRANSITION & GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE (Dec. 2001), available at http://www.pewclimate.org; and JUDITH GREENWALD ET AL., PEW 
CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, COMMUNITY ADJUSTMENT TO CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY (Dec. 
2001), available at http://www.pewclimate.org.
90
 A critical finding of the CRA/CCAP study was that the GHG program it modeled would reduce U.S. tax 
revenues by $50 billion in 2010.  This would correspond to 56 percent of the total value of the allowances 
created under the program.  See CRA/CAAP, supra note 83, at 21.
91 See CRA Study, supra note 83; CRA/CCAP, supra note 83; and LAWRENCE H. GOULDER, MITIGATING 
THE ADVERSE IMPACT OF CO2 ABATEMENT POLICIES ON ENERGY-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES, supra note 83. 
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sector, to help consumers, to aid particularly hard-hit workers or their communities, or to 
prevent a decline in government revenues.92  It should be noted, however, that these 
conclusions are critically dependent on the details of the regulatory program and on 
modeling techniques.  As discussed below, if the regulatory program were less efficient 
than an upstream cap-and-trade program, or if the period for allocation of allowances to 
compensate affected energy firms were limited to say 10 years, then the percentage of 
allowance value allocated to the firms would have to be higher and the percentage 
available for other uses would be (at least initially) much smaller.   
These studies also add an important perspective on the long-standing debate on 
whether, in a free distribution regime, allowances should be allocated on a 
“grandfathering” or “generation performance standard” basis.  If a policy objective of 
allowance allocation is to compensate firms affected by the cap-and-trade program for 
their lost profits, allowances should be distributed to firms based on their projected 
financial losses from the emissions cap, not on the basis of past emissions or current 
output.  Basing an allocation on a firm’s output or emissions has no necessary 
relationship to its economic losses from the program.  Determining the amount of such 
losses on a firm-by- firm basis could be complex, but could be done administratively in 
the same way “stranded investment” is determined in electric restructuring proceedings.93
(b) Allowance Auction and Revenue Recycling
A number of economists and policy analysts advocate that the government 
distribute allowances through an auction or, alternatively, through a fiduciary.94  They 
92 See, e.g., S. 366 (Jeffords, I-VT).  S.366 would establish a utility cap-and-trade program covering 
emissions of CO2, NOx, and SO2.  Under the S.366 scheme, the government would allocate allowances 
annually to five groups:  consumers and households (approximately 64 percent); transition assistance for 
displaced workers and communities (approximately 4.8 percent); firms with electricity-intensive products, 
such as coal and aluminum (approximately 1.2 percent); renewable energy-efficiency/cleaner energy (20 
percent); carbon sequestration (approximately .075 percent), and existing units (approximately 10 percent 
declining to 1 percent in 2017).  For a number of the categories, allowances would go to a trustee, who then 
would be responsible for selling the allowances and redistributing the revenues according to various 
formulae. 
93 See 75 F.E.R.C .¶ 61,080 (April 24, 1996) (commonly known as Order 888).
94
 For studies proposing an auction approach, see, e.g., CRA Study, supra note 83; CRA/CCAP, supra note 
83; DALLAS BURTRAW ET AL., EFFECT OF ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION, supra note 82; LAWRENCE H. 
GOULDER, MITIGATING THE ADVERSE IMPACT, supra note 83; U.S. CBO, EVALUATION OF CAP-AND-
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cite two advantages of this approach.  First, it could provide a potentially less 
cumbersome mechanism for distributing the value of the allowances to groups suffering 
financial losses from a GHG emissions cap.  Instead of giving consumers and others 
allowances to sell, the government itself could sell the allowances and “recycle” the 
revenue to the economically vulnerable groups through lump-sum payments or aid 
programs and/or retain some of the revenues to prevent erosion of the Federal tax base.      
Another use of recycled revenues would be to reduce “distortionary” taxes that 
produce a net drag on the economy.   Economists argue that existing wage-related taxes 
create a disincentive to work and that existing taxes on interest, dividends, capital gains, 
and corporate income discourage productive investments.  According to this argument, 
using the proceeds of an allowance auction to reduce taxes on income or investment 
(instead of as a means of direct compensation) would result in overall economic gains 
that could significantly reduce the cost of GHG regulation to society as a whole.95
BOX 3:  Modeling Design Alternatives for Allowance Allocation:  Results of One 
Study  
TRADE PROGRAMS, supra note 67; PETER CRAMTON AND SUZI KERR, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, 
TRADABLE CARBON PERMIT AUCTIONS: HOW AND WHY TO AUCTION NOT GRANDFATHER (Resources for 
the Future Discussion Paper 98-34, May 1998).  Both the Jeffords bill and the McCain/Lieberman bill 
would distribute allowances to a designated fiduciary and direct the fiduciary to use the proceeds from 
allowance sales to achieve certain purposes.  See S.366, supra note 39, §707 (establishing a trustee); and S. 
139, supra note 40, subtitle C (establishing the “Climate Change Credit Corporation”).  
95
 Economists are careful to note that such efficiency improvements would result only from reductions in 
marginal taxes.  Increases in standard deductions or other per person or per household rebates, on the other 
hand, do not produce such economic gains.  Such approaches just re-distribute the costs of the GHG 
regulatory program.  See CRA/CCAP, supra note 83, at 14.  Also, at one time it was believed that recycling 
revenues from an allowance auction to reduce distortionary taxes would not merely offset some of the costs 
of a GHG emissions cap but actually generate a net gain in GDP, implying that a GHG cap-and-trade 
program could provide a “double dividend” of environmental benefits and economic development.  More 
recent research suggests that this result is highly unlikely because the interaction of the emissions cap and 
existing distortionary taxes (the “tax interaction effect”) makes GHG regulation more costly than was 
previously believed.  See I. Parry et al., When Can Carbon Abatement Policies Increase Welfare?  The 
Fundamental Role of Distorted Factor Markets, 37 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MANAGEMENT 52 (Jan. 1999) 
(finding that the cost to the U.S. economy of a 15 percent reduction in CO2 emissions is 2.6 times greater 
when the tax interaction effect is taken into account).
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A recent Charles River Associates (CRA) study illustrates the potential impacts of 
design alternatives for distributing the allowances under a cap-and-trade program.96  The 
study models an upstream cap-and-trade program that would reduce U.S. GHG emissions 
to 2000 levels in 2010.  The model was run without a number of the flexibility measures 
described above (such as international GHG trading, domestic sequestration, and 
reductions in non-CO2 gases) and did not take into account any benefits of avoided 
climate change damage that may result from the program.  This scenario shows a long-
run reduction in welfare of about 0.4 percent.   Assuming allowance allocations were 
permanent, only about 6 percent of allowances would have to be allocated to firms in the 
energy sector to compensate firms for equity losses resulting from the upstream cap-and-
trade program.97  However, about 50 percent of auction revenues would need to be 
retained by the Federal government to offset revenue losses attributable to the decrease in 
GDP resulting from the program, assuming that the program is to be revenue neutral viz. 
the Federal government and there are no offsetting fiscal benefits from mitigating climate 
change.98  If the balance of the revenues (about 40 percent) were used to reduce marginal 
personal income tax rates, the efficiency gains from this tax reduction would reduce 
overall cost of the program by about 35 percent (so that the long-term welfare loss would 
be about 0.25 percent.99
By contrast to an upstream cap and trade, a downstream cap-and-trade program 
combined with an increase in CAFE standards to 35 MPG would reduce welfare by about 
96
 CRA Study, supra note 83.
97 Id. at 14.  The CRA study defines the energy sectors to include those firms engaged in coal mining, crude 
oil extraction, natural gas production and extraction, petroleum refining, and electricity generation.  Id. at 
10, table 1.  The percentage of allowance proceeds needed to preserve existing assets is highly dependent 
on a number of assumptions.  For example, in a 2002 study done for the Center for Clean Air Policy, 
Charles River Associates used a different modeling design and arrived at percentages ranging from 9-21 
percent.  In both that study and the 2003 study discussed in Box 3, the results varied depending on a 
number of factors, including the assumed scope of trading in the US domestic program and the availability 
of international emissions trading.  See CRA/CCAP, supra note 83, at 25.    
98
 CRA Study, supra note 83, at 16.  
99 Id. at 20.  
48
0.8 percent in the long run, even with the benefit of income tax reductions.100  It would 
also entail a larger share of allowances for the Federal government if the program is to be 
revenue neutral for the Federal government.  At the same time, because fewer sources 
would be subject to a cap-and-trade program, the pool of allowance proceeds from which 
to achieve such compensation would be smaller.  (Note that this scenario does not include 
the trading features discussed below in connection with a sectoral hybrid program.)
A number of recent studies (including the CRA study described in Box # 3) look 
at the efficiency implications of different design options for a cap-and-trade program.  
While the quantitative results of these studies are very much dependant on modeling 
assumptions, they are useful in illustrating the interactions of the design elements of a 
cap-and-trade program.  First, compensatory allowance allocations to energy sector firms, 
if they are made on a permanent basis appear to require only a small percentage of 
allowances (or allowance revenues).  However, if these allocations are made over a 
relatively short transition period (say, 10 years), then the percentage allocated to these 
firms will have to be much larger in the early years of the program. Second, if the 
program is designed to be revenue neutral to the Federal government and policy makers 
assume no offsetting fiscal benefits from the program, then a large proportion of auction 
revenues (in the CRA analysis of an upstream cap-and-trade program, about 50 percent) 
would be retained by the government.  Third, once these prior claims are satisfied, in the 
CRA analysis of an upstream cap-and-trade program, the allowance proceeds that remain 
are sufficient to reduce the social cost of the trading program by 35 percent, if the 
proceeds are dedicated to reducing marginal tax rates.  Fourth, if policy makers settle on 
a program that is less cost-effective than an upstream cap-and-trade program, then the 
costs imposed by the regulatory program will increase while the total allowance proceeds 
available to the government to address those costs will decrease.
For all of these reasons, then, choices respecting allowance allocation have 
important implications both for cost-effectiveness and distributional equity.  They also 
100 Id. at 20-23.
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raise political feasibility issues.  For example, requiring regulated firms to purchase 
allowances through a government auction could be characterized by its opponents as a 
new tax.  In addition, obtaining the efficiency benefits of revenue recycling implies 
taking on not only development of a GHG regulatory program but also tax reform.  
4. Emissions Certainty vs. Cost Certainty
The third critical design issue in designing an emissions trading program is 
determining what balance to strike between certainty about achieving a particular level of 
emission reductions and certainty about costs of compliance.  
Policy-makers can limit the costs of complying with an emissions trading 
program through a “safety valve” feature, which would authorize the government to sell 
additional allowances at a predetermined price.  With a safety-valve mechanism in place, 
the market price of allowances – and therefore the marginal cost of abatement – will rise 
no higher than the safety-valve price.  The effect is to cap compliance costs.101
Establishing a safety valve, however, implies that emissions are not capped.  If 
compliance costs turn out to be higher than expected, firms can purchase more 
allowances and total emissions can rise above the cap.  This is not to say that emissions 
would be entirely unlimited – firms would have to pay the safety-valve price to increase 
their emissions – but the safety-valve option would mean that there was not a precise and 
absolute cap.  Thus, the safety-valve option presents policy-makers with a potential trade-
off between emissions certainty and compliance cost certainty.  
101 See HENRY D. JACOBY AND A. DENNY ELLERMAN, MIT JOINT PROGRAM ON THE SCIENCE AND POLICY 
OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, THE SAFETY VALVE AND CLIMATE POLICY (MIT Joint Program on the 
Science and Policy of Global Climate Change Report No. 83, Feb. 2002), available at
http://web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/reports.html.  During discussions in 1999 regarding proposed “credit 
for early action” legislation, staff at the Resources for the Future suggested the use of a safety valve 
approach.  See RAYMOND KOPP ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, A PROPOSAL FOR CREDIBLE EARLY 
ACTION IN U.S. CLIMATE POLICY (1999),  available at
http://www.weathervane.rff.org/features/feature060.html.
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How important is certainty about meeting a particular emissions cap?  The 
atmosphere is not particularly sensitive to small differences in emissions levels.  
Scientists have not identified a particular threshold level over which the potential for 
damage is great.  For these reasons, policy-makers might not attach significant value to 
assurances that the United States will meet a particular, near-term emissions target with 
precision.  
By contrast, assurances that the compliance costs will not rise above a particular 
per-ton level could be central to building political support to move forward on climate 
change. There are significant differences in opinion on how much it will cost to reduce 
GHG emissions in the United States because the cost would be largely a function of 
future levels of economic activity, which are difficult to forecast.  Yet, establishing a cap-
and-trade program without a safety valve mechanism means that the cap will have to be 
met, regardless of cost.  A safety-valve mechanism can help remove cost uncertainties as 
a barrier to action.102
Some commentators argue that a safety valve mechanism would be, in all cases, 
an ‘easy out’ which would diminish incentives for firms to innovate or to build a bank of 
early reductions, both of which are key factors in driving down the long-term costs of 
reducing emissions.103  However, other commentators have argued that a safety valve 
option could make risk- averse households and firms willing to accept a more aggressive 
102
 A number of the extant proposals for domestic and international cap-and-trade programs include a 
safety-valve provision or similar mechanism.  See, e.g., Americans for Equitable Climate Solutions, supra
note 75; JOSEPH E. ALDY, PETER R. ORSZAG, AND JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, CLIMATE CHANGE:  AN AGENDA 
FOR GLOBAL COLLECTIVE ACTION 27 (Oct. 2001) (prepared for the Pew Center on Global Climate Change 
conference on The Timing of Climate Change Policies);  DAVID G. VICTOR, THE COLLAPSE OF THE KYOTO 
PROTOCOL AND THE STRUGGLE TO SLOW GLOBAL WARMING (2001); W. MCKIBBIN AND P. WILCOXEN, 
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, THE NEXT STEP FOR CLIMATE POLICY (2000), available at
http://www.brookings.org; Competing Utility Emissions Plans May Create Congressional Hurdle, supra
note 69 (describing proposal of the “Clean Power Group,” which includes a “circuit-breaker” provision that 
works like a safety-valve).  In addition, the Bush Administration’s proposed “Clear Skies Act” legislation –
which would set controls on nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, and mercury – incorporates a safety valve.  See 
e.g., S. 2815 (Smith), §403.   
103
 Environmental Defense, an environmental advocacy organization that has been a pioneer in designing 
and promoting market-based approaches to environmental protection has made these arguments.  See, e.g.,
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, FROM OBSTACLE TO OPPORTUNITY:  HOW ACID RAIN EMISSIONS TRADING IS 
DELIVERING CLEANER AIR 36-37 (Sept. 2000) available at
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/645_SO2.pdf.  
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emissions cap (and therefore higher emissions price) than otherwise would be the case 
because they would have assurances that their costs would not exceed the safety-valve 
level.104
Ultimately, the decision as to whether to adopt a safety valve approach or not 
could depend on the timing and stringency of the regulatory program.  Because the 
United States has elected not to become a party to the Kyoto Protocol (at least for now), 
U.S. policy-makers have flexibility in setting the emissions target and compliance 
timetable for a domestic climate program.  They might opt for a gradual approach, i.e., an 
approach that aims to make a start in reducing U.S. emissions while keeping compliance 
costs low.  If policy-makers design such a moderate and therefore relatively lower-cost 
program, they might reasonably conclude that a safety valve provision is unnecessary and 
opt instead for certainty in meeting the target.  Alternatively, they could incorporate a 
safety valve in the program’s early stages and raise the safety-valve price over time. 105
5. Evaluation of Cap-and-Trade Programs
Environmental Effectiveness:  A cap-and-trade program, if comprehensive in coverage 
and properly administered, can be highly effective in meeting its target.  A 
comprehensive upstream cap-and-trade program would be environmentally effective as to 
104 See JOSEPH E. ALDY ET AL., supra note 75.
105 See WILLIAM PIZER, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, CHOOSING PRICE OR QUANTITY CONTROLS FOR 
GREENHOUSE GASES (Resources for the Future Climate Brief #17, July 1999), available at
http://www.rff.org;  see also William Pizer, Combining Price and Quantity Controls to Mitigate Global 
Climate Change, 85 J. PUB. ECON. 409.  In a set of studies, Economist Martin Weitzman was the first to 
find that where costs of compliance are uncertain, “quantity controls” (such as a cap-and-trade programs) 
and “price controls” (such as emission taxes) result in different levels of efficiency.  See Martin Weitzman, 
Prices v. Quantities, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 477 (1974).  Weitzman determined that, where costs are 
uncertain and the marginal benefits of regulation (i.e., the environmental damage avoided) are relatively 
flat, fixing the price first results in a level of costs that approximates what the optimal price will turn out to 
be once costs are known.  By contrast, if the marginal benefits of regulation rise steeply – this would occur 
in situations in which environmental damage is catastrophic after a certain level of emissions – fixing the 
quantity first results in a level of control likely to be in the range of what would be optimal once costs are 
known.  One way to look at an emissions trading program with a safety valve mechanism is that it is a 
hybrid approach, combining elements of a cap-and-trade program and an emissions tax.  Pizer has modeled 
application of such a hybrid approach to climate policy and found substantial gains over a pure quantitative 
(i.e., cap-and-trade) approach.  
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CO2, but may not be feasible for other gases or sinks.  A large source downstream 
program could be equally effective with respect to the sectors it covered, but would have 
to be supported by other measures to provide full coverage.  An all-sector downstream 
program is likely to be ineffective because it could be administered and enforced only 
with great difficulty.
Cost-Effectiveness:  Cap-and-trade programs, if they include flexibility measures, can 
attain emission reductions at low cost.  Allowance allocation policies could increase or 
decrease the costs imposed by the program.  
Administrative Feasiblity: An upstream cap-and-trade program appears to be fully 
administerable for CO2 and for certain other GHGs.  An all-sector downstream cap-and-
trade does not appear to be feasible because of the number of regulated firms involved.  
A hybrid program that combines a downstream cap-and-trade for large sources with an 
upstream program applicable to suppliers of fuel for smaller sources appears to be 
feasible, though somewhat more complex than a full upstream program.
Distributional Equity:  The distributional consequences of a cap-and-trade program 
depend critically on how allowances are allocated, or—if they are auctioned—how the 
auction proceeds are distributed.
Political Acceptability:  Because any all-sector cap-and-trade program (whether upstream 
or downstream) will drive up consumer costs for gasoline, natural gas, and home heating 
oil, it is likely to be politically difficult.  An all-source downstream cap-and-trade, 
because it implies regulating millions of sources, is likely to be even more difficult.  A 
downstream cap-and-trade program limited to electricity generators and other large 
stationary sources could be more acceptable politically, but to be effective it would have 
to be coupled with a regulatory program to cover other sectors.
B. GHG Tax
Another market-based approach to reducing GHG emissions is a GHG tax 
program.  Under such a program, policy-makers would impose a per-ton fee on CO2 
emissions or on the carbon content of fuel. Other GHG emissions to the extent 
measurable would also be taxed.  In addition, the program could be designed so that firms 
could earn a tax credit for CO2 emissions reduced through land-based sequestration 
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projects, carbon capture projects, or for project-based reductions in GHGs that are not 
subject to tax. Firms subject to the tax would have an incentive to reduce their emissions 
(and thereby avoid the tax) until the cost of achieving reductions exceeded the cost of 
paying the tax.  Accordingly, as with an emissions trading program that incorporates a 
“safety valve,” a tax program would provide near-term cost certainty but not absolute 
near-term emissions certainty. 
A tax program would offer practically all of the flexibility (and therefore cost-
effectiveness) of an emissions trading program. Firms would have the incentive and the 
opportunity to adopt the lowest-cost means of reducing their energy-related emissions; 
the “payment” for additional reductions would take the form of tax savings. Just as firms 
subject to an emissions trading program could bank excess allowances, firms 
participating in an emissions tax program could bank (literally) their tax savings 
fromreducing their emissions.  Tax credits also could be made available for emissions 
reductions achieved through projects financed in other countries or for valid emissions 
allowances acquired from other countries’ regulatory programs.106
Designing a domestic GHG tax program would raise some of the same 
fundamental issues that arise in designing an emissions trading program.  For example, it 
would be necessary to determine whether the program should tax upstream firms, 
downstream firms, or some combination of the two.  The analysis is largely the same as 
that for an emissions trading program.  A downstream tax would take the form of a tax on 
CO2 and certain other GHG emissions.  Because enforcing the tax would require tracking 
the emissions of each firm subject to the tax, a downstream emissions tax, like a 
downstream emissions trading program, could not feasibly reach all of the hundreds of 
106
 A carbon tax program might have difficulty in accommodating those firms that otherwise would be able 
to sell their surplus U.S. allowances into an international emissions trading market.  See ROBERT W. HAHN 
AND ROBERT N. STAVINS, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, WHAT HAS KYOTO WROUGHT?  THE REAL 
ARCHITECTURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADABLE PERMIT MARKETS (Resources for the Future Discussion 
Paper 99-30, 1999), available at http://www.rff.org.  However, this may be an immaterial concern since, as 
discussed above, under the Marrakech Accords that implement the Kyoto Protocol, there appears to be little 
possibility that U.S. reductions can be credited against other countries’ emissions reduction obligations 
under the Protocol (though nothing in the Marrakech Accords precludes the United States from establishing 
a GHG program that credits Kyoto units.) 
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millions of sources of CO2 emissions in the economy.  An upstream tax program would 
take the form of a tax on the carbon content of fuels sold into the energy system.  Like an 
upstream emissions trading program, an upstream GHG tax could be applied to a few 
thousand firms that produce, refine, and market fuels.  The tax on these firms would lead 
to higher prices for carbon-intensive fuel and higher prices for energy.  The program thus 
could effectively regulate the entire energy system, providing downstream firms with 
incentives to switch fuels, increase energy efficiency, and reduce energy use. 
A tax program would raise revenue in much the same way as would an emissions 
trading program with an allowance auction.  Accordingly, a tax program would offer an 
opportunity to reduce “distortionary” taxes on labor or capital.  In addition, revenues 
from the tax could be used for any of the purposes described above with regard to 
revenues from an allowance auction, such as assisting vulnerable workers and 
communities. 
In addition, it is possible to design a tax program to mimic the effect of free 
distribution of allowances under an emissions trading program.  How would this work?  
The tax program could offer an exemption from the tax up to a certain fixed amount of 
tons of carbon supplied (upstream) or emitted (downstream).107  As with free allocation 
of allowances, a tax program could base the size of the exemption on particular 
characteristics of the firms, such as output in a base year.  The tax program still could 
achieve its environmental objective so long as firms remain subject to the tax at the 
margin, i.e., for the last tons supplied (upstream) or emitted (downstream).  However, as 
with free allocation of allowances in an emissions trading program, a modified tax would 
reduce the burden of the program on those firms directly subject to the tax, but would not 
assist firms and consumers suffering indirect costs from the tax program.  They would 
not pay the tax and therefore would not benefit from the partial exemption, yet they still 
would bear financial losses as a result of the program.  Of course, opting for this kind of 
107 See LAWRENCE H. GOULDER, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, CONFRONTING THE ADVERSE INDUSTRY 
IMPACTS OF CARBON DIOXIDE ABATEMENT POLICIES:  WHAT DOES IT COST? 3-4 (2000), available at
http://www.rff.org.  For a tax exemption to be fully equivalent to free distribution, the exemption would 
have to be converted to some form of tradeable tax credit.
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modified GHG tax would reduce the total revenues brought in by the tax program and 
therefore reduce the ability to achieve other objectives with those revenues. 
Finally, the major problem with a GHG tax is that it is a tax.  As we note above, 
U.S. experience since 1973 indicates that taxes as an instrument of energy or 
environmental policy, no matter how pressing the need, have not been accepted by 
Congress or the public.  Thus, a workable GHG tax system could be devised, but its 
adoption would appear to contradict conventional political wisdom.  On the other hand, a 
GHG tax system could be politically palatable if it were an integral part of a 
comprehensive reform of the tax code, in which the GHG tax replaced or reduced other, 
even more unpopular taxes.   
1. Evaluation of GHG Tax Approach
Environmental Effectiveness:  A GHG tax program (upstream) could be highly effective 
in reducing U.S. GHG emissions because of its economy-wide coverage of CO2
emissions. However, if certainty in meeting a particular short-term emissions target were 
a priority, a tax program would be less preferable than an upstream cap-and-trade 
program.  As with a trading program, sources and sinks not amenable to direct taxation 
would have to be addressed through a tax credit mechanism or through standards. 
Cost-Effectiveness:  A GHG tax program would offer all sources incentives and 
opportunities to adopt their least-cost mitigation options.  As a price-based program, a tax 
program would offer certainty as to compliance costs.  As with allowance allocation, 
different use of the tax revenues could decrease or increase the total cost imposed by the 
program.  
Administrative Feasibility:  An upstream GHG tax program would not present significant 
administrative complexities.  An economy-wide downstream GHG tax program, on the 
other hand, would be administratively infeasible.
Distributional Equity:  The distributional consequences of a GHG tax depend critically on 
how tax revenues are used.
Political Acceptability:  Experience suggests that Americans are reflexively opposed both 
to tax programs and to gasoline price increases.  The GHG tax combines the two.  A 
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GHG tax approach might have some appeal if introduced as part of a tax reform package 
that included cuts in income or payroll taxes.  
C. Sectoral Hybrid Program
1. Introduction
The final of the three major design options for a U.S. climate change program 
analyzed in this paper is a “sectoral hybrid” program.  A sectoral hybrid program could 
combine a downstream cap-and-trade program for large sources in the electricity and 
industrial sectors with enhanced product efficiency standards to cover small GHG 
sources (mainly consumer products and equipment) in the transportation, residential, and 
building sectors.108  This hybrid approach has the potential of avoiding some of the 
political challenges associated with a full upstream cap-and-trade program or GHG tax.  
A sectoral hybrid program would provide a mechanism to reach transportation 
and household emissions that policy-makers may be unwilling or unable to regulate 
directly (as through a downstream cap-and-trade program) or through regulation of fuels 
(as through an upstream cap-and-trade program).  The standards component of the 
program would regulate the performance characteristics of newly-manufactured products 
used in the transportation sector and in the residential and commercial buildings sector.  
For example, while it would not be administratively feasible to directly regulate every 
household on the basis of its furnace use or every motorist on the basis of emissions 
resulting from use of his or her motor vehicle, it would be feasible to implement 
standards that force more energy-efficient furnaces and more fuel-efficient cars into the 
marketplace.  
One advantage of using product efficiency standards to complement a cap-and-
trade program is that policy-makers could build upon the energy efficiency standards 
already in effect under U.S. law.  Some of the flexibility benefits of a cap-and-trade 
program can be attained by establishing “tradable” standards, thus providing a degree of 
108
 CCAP and the Heinz Center have explored domestic policy designs that would combine a cap-and-trade 
program with standards for downstream firms.  See CCAP, OPTIONS THAT INCLUDE DOWNSTREAM 
SOURCES, supra note 71; H. JOHN HEINZ CENTER FOR SCIENCE, ECONOMICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT, 
DESIGNS FOR DOMESTIC CARBON EMISSIONS TRADING 56-67 (September 1998) (describing “Option III” 
and “Option IV”).
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exchange between sectors subject to a cap-and-trade program and sectors subject to 
standards. While a sectoral hybrid program could be attractive to policy-makers because 
it starts with familiar elements, it would require addressing or accepting a number of 
problematic aspects of a product efficiency standards program.  A sectoral hybrid still 
would leave noticeable gaps in emissions coverage, unless current efficiency standards 
were significantly expanded.  In addition, transforming conventional standards into 
“tradable” standards and coordinating the standards program with the cap-and-trade 
program would pose considerable administrative challenges.  And even if these obstacles 
could be overcome, a standards program remains inherently less cost-effective than a full 
upstream cap-and-trade program because standards do not provide any incentives to 
reduce use nor do they dictate the rate at which end-users replace their old products for 
more efficient, new ones. 
Box 4:  EXAMPLE OF A SECTORAL HYBRID PROGRAM
PHASE I
Tradeable Standards:  
Autos:
All automobiles using gasoline or diesel fuel would be subject to a 
tightened CAFE standard that would be translated into a “MPG-equivalent 
standard” for CO2 emissions trading purposes Manufacturers could trade 
between product lines, with each other, and with firms subject to cap-and-
trade programs (see below).  Non-automobile engines using gasoline or 
diesel would be subject to comparable standards.
Appliances:
Appliance standards for gas and oil-fired equipment could be strengthened 
and converted to CO2 emission standards, and expanded to cover all 
natural gas and oil-fired equipment used in residential or commercial 
applications that consume any significant amount of energy.  As with 
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autos, manufacturers could trade among covered product lines, among 
manufacturers, and with firms subject to cap-and-trade.  Efficiency 
standards for electric appliances would be retained to prevent electric 
appliances from gaining a competitive advantage over gas appliances 
subject to standards. 
Downstream Cap-and-Trade:
Electricity generators and other large stationary sources would be subject to a 
downstream cap-and-trade program modeled on the CAA acid rain program. 
Flexibility measures would be included.  Sources and sinks of GHGs not covered 
by the cap-and trade program or standards would be addressed through project-
based credit trading.  Policy-makers could consider establishing a “safety-valve.”  
Allowance Allocation:
A percentage of allowances would be distributed free to electricity generators, 
coal producers, and certain industrial energy users for a limited period.  The 
balance would be auctioned.  
Revenue Recycling:
Auction revenues would be used to reduce taxes and for lump-sum payments to 
individuals and/or communities.  
POTENTIAL PHASE II: 
Upstream Cap-and-Trade:
Refiners, gas pipelines, coal processors, fossil-fuel importers, and certain other 
firms would be required to surrender allowances to cover the carbon content of 
fossil fuels sold or used by those firms.  Full flexibility would be permitted 
including trading with the sectors outside the upstream cap-and-trade program.  
However, the following sales and uses would be exempt from the upstream 
allowance requirement (because they would be controlled directly or indirectly by 
the downstream cap-and-trade or the product efficiency standards program):
(1) Gasoline or diesel fuel sold or used in automobiles or engines.
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(2) Natural gas, natural gas liquids, or fuel oil sold for use in a 
residential or commercial building.
(3) Any fuel used in an electric generation unit or other large 
stationary source covered by the downstream program.  
Sources and sinks of GHGs not covered by the cap-and-trade program would be 
addressed through project-based crediting.
2. Designing the Standards Component of a Sectoral Hybrid 
Program
Designing the product efficiency standards component of a sectoral hybrid would 
involve a number of steps.  First, it would be necessary to adapt existing standards to the 
new purpose of regulating GHG emissions.  Second, policy-makers may decide that it is 
necessary to develop new standards for products and processes not now covered by 
standards.  Third, policy-makers may want to formulate many of the standards as 
“tradable” standards.  
Most existing standards are expressed in terms of an energy efficiency 
requirement, e.g., miles per gallon.  In a climate program, policy-makers would need to 
translate these standards from energy-per-unit-of-output to GHG- emissions-per-unit-of-
output or at least adjust the standards to reflect the carbon content of different fuels. To 
achieve broad coverage of emissions, a sectoral hybrid program would necessitate the 
establishment of a range of new standards.  While standards currently are in place for 
most major energy-using consumer products and equipment (including motor vehicles, 
and residential and commercial natural gas and oil-fired equipment), standards do not 
apply to most commercial and industrial equipment.  Federal standards also do not apply 
to building envelopes (i.e., heat loss and heat gain from buildings).  For example, air 
conditioner standards will ultimately result in more efficient air conditioners replacing
less efficient ones, but they do not deal with energy loss from un-insulated buildings.  
Most importantly, however, standards are not currently in place for a range of sources in 
the transportation sector, including locomotives, vessels, aircraft, buses, and heavy 
trucks; these uncovered sources accounted for nearly 50 percent of GHG emissions in the 
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transportation sector in 2002.109  For these reasons, combining a large-source cap-and-
trade program with existing standards only would reach approximately 80 percent of the 
nation’s energy-related CO2 emissions.110
Another design consideration is the inflexibility of conventional standards.  
Typically, standards reflect a command-and-control approach, i.e., they prescribe a 
uniform emissions limit or technology without regard to the varying circumstances of the 
regulated firms.  Accordingly, reliance on conventional standards would mean forgoing 
the flexibility benefits of emissions trading.  
One solution to this problem is to design “tradable” standards.  How would such 
standards work?  A tradable standards program would use estimates of the average life 
and use of a product to translate over-compliance with a standard into a stream of 
emission allowances assigned to particular years, i.e., “vintaged” allowances.111
Conversely, the program would translate a failure to achieve the standard into an 
annualized deficit of allowances.  Box 5 provides a detailed description of how a 
tradeable standards program for motor vehicles (referred to as “Corporate Average 
Carbon Efficiency” [CACE] standard) could work. 
Tradeable standards would increase the flexibility and therefore reduce the cost 
for firms to comply with standards.  Such an approach could provide for at least three 
levels of trading:  (1) intra-firm trading, in which a firm could achieve an average level of 
efficiency across its product lines, instead of being required to meet the standard for each 
109 See USEPA, supra note 7, at Table 1-14.
110
 The approximately twenty-percent of emissions uncovered by a sectoral hybrid program comprise 
sources that neither use electricity (and therefore are not reached by the cap on power plants) nor are 
regulated by existing standards.  These include sources in the transportation sector (locomotives, freight 
trucks, certain commercial vehicles, aircraft, ships and barges); the commercial buildings sector (natural 
gas-fired heating and cooling equipment); and the industrial sector (boilers and furnace heaters in industrial 
sources not participating in the cap-and-trade program.) 
111
 The reason to have vintaged allowances is to make clear when allowances may be used for compliance.  
If a U.S. domestic program sets a series of discrete compliance periods into the future, policy-makers might 
want to allow only certain vintages of allowances to be used in certain periods.  Absent such a restriction, 
the CACE approach would allow firms to meet their emission reduction obligations in a near-term 
compliance period with allowances representing emission reductions that will not take place until many 
years later.  See S. WINKELMAN ET AL., supra note 71, at 16. 
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product line; (2) trading among firms subject to standards; and (3) trading between firms 
subject to standards and firms subject to the cap-and-trade program.
Box 5:  Corporate Average Carbon Efficiency (CACE) Standard
Assume the vehicle efficiency standard were set at 30 mpg and the automaker had 
sold 1,000,000 cars with an average fuel economy of 27 mpg, and estimated annual 
vehicle miles traveled for each car was 10,000 miles.112
Annual emissions at CACE level =  (1,000,000 cars) x (10,000 miles) / (30 mpg) 
x (.01 tons CO2/gal) = 3,333,333 tons CO2
Actual annual emissions = (1,000,000 cars) x (10,000 miles) / (27 mpg) 
x (.01 tons CO2/gal) = 3,703,704 tons CO2
The automaker would have to buy 370,371 tons CO2-eq. of 
allowances each year to comply.
As discussed in greater detail below, a potential drawback of a tradable standards 
approach – and, indeed, any approach that relies on standards – is that it does not ensure 
that emissions will be limited at any particular level.  An alternative approach that could 
address this drawback is a capped tradable standards program.113  Under such an 
112
 This example is adapted from S. WINKELMAN ET AL., supra note 71, at 22. 
113
 For descriptions of capped tradable standards approaches, See S. WINKELMAN ET AL., supra note 71; and 
H. John Heinz Center for Science, Economics, and the Environment, supra note __, at Appendix 5.  
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approach, policy-makers would set a cap on the total emissions associated with particular 
types of newly-manufactured products.  To sell products subject to the capped standard, 
manufacturers would have to obtain and surrender allowances.  In other words, it would 
not be sufficient merely to produce products that met the standard; manufacturers would 
have to account for the projected emissions associated with each product they sold.  A 
capped tradable standards program would entail resolving a number of design issues, 
including issues related to allowance allocation, shutdowns, new market entrants, 
changes in manufacturer market share, and changes in overall level of output.
It is important to note that either tradable standards or capped tradable standards 
could raise intra-industry competitiveness issues.  Firms with a wide range of product 
lines may be able to generate internal allowances from efficient product lines that can be 
used to “subsidize” inefficient products in other product lines – arguably to the 
competitive detriment of single product line manufacturers.114
3. Integrating Tradable Standards with a Cap-and-Trade Program
Developing a domestic program that combines tradable standards with a cap-and-
trade program raises an additional design issue.  If trading is allowed between firms 
subject to standards and firms subject to a cap, how will such trading be regulated so as to 
prevent “double-counting” of reductions?
For example, if a firm that manufactured an electrical appliance (e.g., a 
refrigerator) exceeded the efficiency standard for that product, the resulting improvement 
in efficiency would reduce electricity use and therefore reduce emissions by electricity 
generators.  If the refrigerator manufacturer earned a tradable allowance for its over-
compliance and the resultant emissions reduction by the electric generator also created a 
surplus allowance, the same ton of CO2 reductions would generate two tons of 
allowances.  To deal with this problem, manufacturers of electricity-consuming products 
114
 In addition, it is important to note that the efficiency gains of making standards tradable do not always 
exceed the administrative costs.  In some cases, it is just as or more cost-effective to simply prescribe a 
particular uniform emissions limit, technology, or practice.  See Daniel H. Cole and Peter Z. Grossman, 
When is Command-and-Control Efficient?  Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of 
Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection, in LAND USE AND ENVIRONMENT LAW 
REVIEW—2001 509 (A. Dan Tarlock and David Callies eds., 2001).  
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that are subject to standards could be precluded from trading outside their own sectors but 
there would be no reason not to allow them trade between electric product lines and with 
other firms subject to electric product efficiency standards.  
The double-counting issue would not be an issue for products that emit CO2
directly, e.g., automobiles or gas appliances.  Accordingly, a hybrid program could 
permit manufacturers of such products to trade freely into the cap-and-trade market.115
Box 6:  Alternative Hybrid Options
While the focus of this section of the paper is on a program that would combine 
product efficiency standards with a large-source downstream cap-and-trade program, it 
also would be possible to integrate product efficiency standards with an upstream cap-
and-trade program.116  Two such options are described below:
Product Efficiency Standards That Supplement an Upstream Cap-and-Trade Program
This hybrid would use product efficiency standards to supplement a full upstream 
cap-and-trade program.  It would layer standards on top of the upstream program, i.e.,
115
 Such trading, however, raises a separate issue.  Some analysts argue that because tradable standards do 
not effect an absolute cap on emissions from firms subject to those standards, a hybrid program should not 
allow trading between firms subject to standards and firm subject to a cap, even though it is not clear that 
such trading could result in any increase in total emissions.  The United Kingdom has established an 
emissions trading program in which firms subject to a cap (referred to as an “absolute target”) may trade 
with firms subject to a tradable standard (referred to as a “relative target.”)  However, the U.K. requires 
such trades go through a mechanism called the “gateway.” The gateway tracks all allowance transfers and 
ensures that there is no net transfer of allowances from the relative to the absolute sector.  In other words, a 
firm in the relative sector may sell an excess allowance through the gateway to the absolute sector only 
when the net flow of allowances from the absolute sector into the relative sector is positive.  See U.K. 
DEPARTMENT FOR ENVIRONMENT, FOOD, AND RURAL AFFAIRS, FRAMEWORK FOR THE UK EMISSIONS 
TRADING SCHEME, available at http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/trading/index.htm. 
116
 Sectoral hybrid programs that combine standards with an upstream, rather than downstream, cap-and-
trade program raise significant coordination issues.  The predicate of such a program is that a fuel use is 
exempt from allowance requirements only if the product in which the fuel is used is covered by a product 
standard.  However, this predicate may be unrealistic in practice because exclusions for particular types of 
fuel uses might not be feasible to administer.  Gasoline suppliers will be unable to distinguish between fuel 
purchased for use in an automobile subject to fuel economy standards as opposed to a lawn mower not 
subject to standards.  Similarly, natural gas distributors may not be able to distinguish between gas used in 
a furnace subject to efficiency standards, and gas used at a distributed generation unit that is not.  Finally, 
any program in which some fuel distributed is subject to an allowance requirement and other fuel is exempt 
gives rise to risks of evasion.  When faced with these problems, designers of such a program are likely to 
have three choices:  (1) fine tune the definitions of excluded fuel uses so that any fuel use not subject to 
standards is covered by the cap-and-trade program; (2) expand the standards program to cover all exempt 
uses; or (3) ignore fuel use by products not subject to standards, where the use is not associated with 
significant emissions.
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firms subject to the upstream program still would be required to hold allowances for the 
carbon content of all fuel they distribute to downstream users, including fuel they send 
for use in products subject to standards.117  Under this approach the upstream program 
would still be subject to an economy wide cap; the standards would be there to help 
ensure that efficient products reach the market when consumers need them.  Firms 
subject to standards could trade with one another, but to avoid double- counting, they 
could not trade into the cap-and-trade program.   
Product Efficiency Standards That Complement an Upstream Cap-and-Trade Program
Under this hybrid option, an upstream cap-and-trade program would apply to all 
fuels except fuels used in products subject to standards.  Thus, if product efficiency 
standards applied to automobiles and consumer products that used home heating fuels, 
then gasoline, home heating oils and residential gas would be exempt from upstream 
allowance requirements.  A broader standards program – one that included large trucks 
and commercial heating equipment – could be linked to broader exclusions from the 
upstream cap-and-trade program, thus allowing diesel fuel and fuel delivered for use in 
commercial buildings to be outside the cap-and-trade program.  A variant of this 
approach would set up a product efficiency standards program, a downstream cap-and-
trade for electricity generators and other large stationary sources, and an upstream 
program applicable to fuel distributed for all uses other than automobile, residential and 
commercial use and electricity generators.  Designing this hybrid approach also would 
require addressing double-counting risks. 
4. Sectoral Hybrid Approach Issues
Even a well-designed sectoral hybrid program has some significant drawbacks 
compared to an economy-wide upstream cap-and-trade program.  
First, standards provide no incentive to adopt what, in many cases, may be the 
lowest-cost abatement option:  reduced use. As explained below, the absence of any 
117
 As used here, the term “consumers subject to standards” encompasses consumers directly subject to 
standards (e.g., electricity-generators) and consumers using products that are subject to standards (e.g., 
motorists).    
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incentive to reduce use means that a standards approach – even if the standards are 
tradable – may be a significantly less cost-effective means of meeting any emissions limit 
than a cap-and-trade program that regulates fuel producers or end-users directly. 
In the transportation sector, for example, standards would force lower-emitting 
vehicles into the marketplace, but they would not provide any incentive for motorists to 
drive less.Indeed, if gasoline prices were to stay the same, motorists that purchased 
compliant vehicles might increase their miles traveled because more fuel-efficient 
vehicles cost less to drive.  This is sometimes referred to as the “rebound effect,” which 
could offset some of the projected emissions reductions.118  In addition, standards only 
apply to new products, not existing products. Accordingly, the effectiveness of standards 
in limiting emissions would depend on the rate at which consumers replaced their old, 
unregulated products with the new, regulated ones.119 Gauging this rate is complicated 
by the “junker effect”:  subjecting products to standards may increase their price, thereby 
encouraging consumers to hold onto their unregulated (higher-emitting) models.120
A third potential drawback of a standards approach is that it relies heavily on 
estimates.  For each standard, policy-makers would have to formulate various estimates 
of lifetime product use and associated emissions and rates of adoption.  Even a capped 
tradable standards program only would “cap” projected, not actual, lifetime emissions 
associated with covered products.  The heavy reliance on estimates means that a hybrid 
program would offer substantially less certainty about meeting emission reduction goals 
than a cap-and-trade program. 
118
 Some studies suggest that a 10 percent increase in fuel efficiency for automobiles likely would result in 
a 1 to 2 percent increase in vehicle miles traveled.  See National Research Council, supra note 29, at 19
(citing D.L. Greene et al., Fuel Economy Rebound Effect for U.S. Household Vehicles, 20 ENERGY J. 1 
(1999); and J. Haughton and S. Sarker, Gasoline Tax as a Corrective Tax:  Estimates for the United States:  
1970-1991, 17 ENERGY J. 103 (1996)).
119
 S. Winkelman et al., discuss an approach in which responsibility for emissions from the on-road fleet of 
vehicles would be distributed among automakers, but note several shortcomings of such an approach. S. 
WINKELMAN ET AL., supra note 71, at 14-16.
120 Id. at 15.  The “junker effect” also is sometimes referred to as “new source bias.”
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Fourth, a hybrid program also would be more difficult to administer over time 
than an upstream cap-and-trade program.  With an upstream cap-and-trade program in 
place, gradually phasing in more ambitious national emission targets would involve little 
more than gradually ratcheting down the economy-wide cap.  Achieving the same result 
with a hybrid program, on the other hand, would involve continuously promulgating 
adjustments to multiple standards for multiple sectors.  
To date, none of the economic studies has modeled a sectoral hybrid with 
tradeable standards.  However, analysis of hybrid programs without the trading feature 
indicates that these programs entail significantly greater cost by comparison to an 
upstream cap-and-trade program.  It is possible that a sectoral hybrid program could be 
substantially less cost-effective, as well as more administratively burdensome, than an 
economy-wide upstream cap-and-trade or tax program.121
6. Evaluation of Sectoral Hybrid Approach
Environmental Effectiveness:  A sectoral hybrid would have higher environmental 
effectiveness than a downstream program alone, because standards could address 
emissions from sources that could not be covered by a downstream cap-and-trade 
program.  On the other hand, it would be less effective than an economy-wide upstream-
cap-and-trade program because standards would not address intensity of product use or 
121
 The Congressional Budget Office arrived at this conclusion in a 2002 study assessing options for 
reducing gasoline consumption.  See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING GASOLINE 
CONSUMPTION, supra note 78.  Two economists, W. David Montgomery and Anne Smith, have attempted 
to quantify the costs of using various domestic program types to meet a particular national emissions limit.  
See W. DAVID MONTGOMERY AND ANNE E. SMITH, CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES, INTERACTIONS BETWEEN 
DOMESTIC POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL PERMIT TRADING REGIMES (2000).  Montgomery and Smith 
determined that a pure upstream cap-and-trade program or a carbon tax would result in the lowest social 
welfare costs.  They also found that a program that used standards to limit emissions from certain sectors 
would result in lower costs than a program that left those sectors entirely unregulated (e.g., a domestic 
climate policy that relied only on a downstream cap-and-trade program for large sources).  They concluded, 
however, that, compared to a pure upstream cap-and-trade program, a program that relied on conventional 
standards would be anywhere from 20 to 170 percent more costly, depending on assumptions about the 
availability of international trading.  While the scenario modeled by Smith and Montgomery did not 
involve tradable standards, even a program that relied substantially on tradable standards is likely to be less 
cost-effective than an upstream cap-and-trade program because of the absence of any incentives to reduce 
use.  
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replacement rate of new products for old.  In addition, not all sources that fall outside a 
large source cap-and-trade program could be regulated through standards.
Cost-Effectiveness:  A sectoral hybrid program would be a more costly means of 
achieving any particular emissions target than an economy-wide upstream cap-and-trade 
program.  The ultimate cost of the sectoral hybrid option also would depend on, among 
other things, whether the standards were tradable standards. 
Administrative Feasibility:  It would be relatively straightforward to modify existing 
efficiency standards for purposes of a sectoral hybrid program.  However, transforming 
such conventional standards into tradable standards would present some new 
complexities.  Capped tradable standards present significant design issues.  In addition, 
hybrid programs are significantly more complex administratively than any of their 
individual elements because of the need for coordination.  Trading would need to be 
carefully regulated to prevent double-counting of emission reductions and evasion of 
allowance requirements.  In addition, promulgating new standards to cover products and 
practices not now subject to standards would be an additional administrative burden.
Distributional Equity:  A sectoral hybrid program could exclude households from the 
direct burden of regulation under the cap-and-trade program but such an approach would 
increase electricity prices and would put additional burdens on the manufacturing sector 
(these burdens would be felt indirectly by households in the form of higher product 
prices).  The ultimate distribution of impacts from a sectoral hybrid program also would 
depend on how policy-makers opted to distribute allowances (or the revenues from an 
allowance auction). 
Political Acceptability:  Hybrid programs offer policy-makers options for addressing 
domestic GHG emissions while avoiding gasoline and home heating fuel price increases.  
In particular, a sectoral hybrid would offer a means of largely avoiding these price 
increases (but not electric rate increases) albeit at some cost to environmental 
effectiveness.  Also, the familiarity of the standards component may enhance its
acceptability.
68
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Policy-makers in the United States face a plethora of choices for the design of a 
domestic GHG regulatory program—upstream or downstream cap-and-trade, GHG tax, 
product standards, and hybrid programs—as well as the myriad details of program design 
that must be addressed once the overall approach is chosen.
Using the criteria spelled out in Section IV, we evaluated the principal design 
options.  The results of that evaluation are detailed in Section V and summarized below.
A. Cap-and-Trade Programs
1. All-source Downstream Cap-and-Trade  
An economy-wide downstream cap-and-trade program—because it implies the 
regulation of millions of individual GHG sources, including cares and homes—would be 
difficult and costly to administer.  It would not be a viable prospect for a domestic GHG 
regulatory program.
2. Upstream Cap-and-Trade  
An economy-wide upstream cap-and-trade program would be environmentally 
effective, could attain least-cost compliance if it incorporates flexibility measures, and 
would be administratively feasible.  Its distributional consequences would depend on how 
allowances were allocated and, if auctioned, how the auction revenues were recycled 
back into the economy.  These allocation and revenue recycling decisions would 
influence overall compliance costs.  Some methods of allocating allowances (such as 
generation performance standards) are less economically efficient than others, and can be 
less efficient than an auction.  According to some economists, using auction revenues to 
reduce “distortionary” taxed could partially offset the costs of the program.  Finally, 
because an economy-wide upstream cap-and-trade program would drive up the cost of 
gasoline and home heating fuels, it is likely to present a political challenge.
Thus, if policy-makers were willing to accept a program that results in visible 
increases in gasoline and home heating fuel prices, one environmentally effective, 
efficient, and feasible option would be a comprehensive upstream cap-and-trade program.  
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Such a program could be coupled with limited free distribution of allowance to 
compensate affected business, auction of the remaining allowances, and the use of 
auction revenues for tax reductions and other ends.
There are substantial theoretical benefits from such an approach.  The near-term 
environmental outcome is clear, assuming that the government will maintain the emission 
limits in the face of possibly significant price uncertainty and volatility.  Current analysis 
indicated that it would minimize economic costs to the economy, be manageable 
administratively, avoid overcompensating existing emitters, and perhaps capture some 
offsetting benefits from reduction of distortionary taxes.
But, an economy-wide upstream cap-and-trade program raises a number of issues.  
First, critics may characterize it as a large, ambitious, and untried experiment in 
regulation, and may question how it will work in practice.  Second, auction revenues may 
be difficult to predict, making it difficult to match the question of whether (and when) 
Congress will enact such a system.  Even in times of most compelling national 
circumstances, such as the 1973 Arab oil embargo, Congress has not been willing to 
allow fuel prices to increase sufficiently to bring demand in balance with supply.122  On 
the other hand, adopting an upstream cap-and-trade program does not inevitably mean 
accepting a significant and immediate hike in consumer fuel prices.  The price impacts 
could be limited to only a few cents per gallon if the program began with a moderate 
emissions target and then phased in a more stringent target gradually over time, or 
incorporated use of a “safety valve.”
A workable variant of the upstream cap-and-trade program described above is an 
“upstream/downstream” design that combines a downstream cap-and-trade program for 
electricity generators and other large sources with an upstream cap-and-trade program for 
other major sectors of the economy.  The McCain-Lieberman bill (see p. 9) reflects this 
approach.
3. Large-Source Downstream Cap-and-Trade
122
   As we discuss in supra note 54, Congress’ response to the Arab Oil Embargo was to impose price 
controls rather than let prices rise to world market levels.
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 A large-source downstream program (i.e., one applicable to electricity generators 
and large industrial sources of CO and of certain other greenhouse gases) is 
administratively feasible and could be environmentally effective with respect to the 
sectors it covered.  To be fully effective, however, such an approach would have to be 
coupled with a program to cover other sectors.  A large-source downstream program 
might be more acceptable politically than an upstream economy-wide program because it 
would not result in price increases for gasoline and home heating fuels (though it still 
would result in price increases for electricity).
B. GHG Tax 
An upstream GHG tax program would allow for adoption of least-cost mitigation 
strategies, offer short- term cost certainty, and be administratively feasible.  A tax 
program would not provide certainty in meeting a particular short-term emissions target.  
However, because it is cumulative rather than annual emissions that are important, taxes 
should be able to provide almost equivalent long-term environmental certainty if there is 
political will to adjust them over time.  The ultimate distributional consequences of a 
GHG tax would depend on how policy-makers distributed revenues from the tax.  
However, political acceptability is likely to be a major obstacle since a GHG tax 
combines both new taxes and fuel price increases.  A GHG tax may be more politically 
attractive as part of a larger tax reform program.
C. Sectoral Hybrid Program
A sectoral hybrid program such as the one outlined in Box 4 (p. 35) would consist 
of a large-source downstream program coupled with product efficiency standards.  Such a 
program would be more environmentally effective than a downstream program alone (or 
standards alone), because standards could address emissions from sources, such as 
automobiles and appliances, that could not feasibly be covered by the downstream cap-
and-trade program.  Relying on existing standards programs, the first phase of such a 
program could attain coverage of about 80 percent of U.S. energy-related CO emissions.  
A second phase of the program could address the remaining 20 percent through an 
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upstream cap-and-trade program or through expanded product efficiency standards; the 
program could cover emissions of other greenhouse gases through other measures. 
A sectoral hybrid program has the advantage of building on existing regulation, 
and in the case of CAFE and appliance standards, potentially improving on it (by 
permitting manufacturers to trade among product lines, with each other, and with other 
sectors).  It would avoid the politically difficult step of attaching a carbon cost to the 
price of gasoline and home heating.  The tradable standard feature would capture some 
(but not all) of the benefits of a full cap-and-trade system.
However, these largely political attractions of the hybrid program could come at 
some cost.  Substituting product efficiency standards for the transportation fuel 
component of an upstream cap-and-trade program may downgrade the cost-effectiveness 
of a program.  Even with a trading feature that tries to equate marginal control costs 
among sectors, a product efficiency standards program lacks incentives to discourage 
product end-use (and, indeed, might actually encourage greater use, via the “rebound 
effect”) or to encourage consumers to replace their existing inefficient products for the 
more efficient new ones (the “junker effect”).  The absence of such incentives is likely to 
make a domestic program that relies on product efficiency standards as an alternative to 
upstream regulation a more expensive approach to meeting any GHG reduction target.  In 
addition, incorporating tradable standards would present significant administrative 
challenges because of the need to prevent double-counting of emission reductions and to 
deal with potential compliance evasion.  Finally, any hybrid program is likely to give 
some beneficiaries of the program a vested interesting retaining it, significantly 
increasing the difficulty of ultimately converting the hybrid program into a simpler, more 
efficient economy-wide upstream cap-and-trade program.
In sum, the analysis would argue against an economy-wide downstream cap-and-
trade program (as difficult to administer), a stand-alone large source cap-and-trade 
program (as incomplete), and a GHG tax that is not part of a larger tax reform initiative 
(as unviable politically).  The analysis does suggest that the comprehensive, upstream 
cap-and-trade approach and the sectoral hybrid approach are the most viable alternatives 
for a domestic GHG reduction program.  While an economy-wide cap-and-trade 
72
approach may present the best option for low-cost reductions in greenhouse gases, there 
are a set of existing sector-based approaches that could be built upon to address 
greenhouse gases—e.g., the Acid Rain program for electricity generators, appliance 
efficiency standards, and motor vehicle fuel economy standards.  For a variety of 
institutional, practical, and political reasons, a U.S. domestic emissions reduction 
program may evolve in this direction.  If policy-makers decide on that course, then 
careful attention will have to be given to minimizing the economic costs and 
administrative complexity, and assuring that the program can be effectively enforced.
